Tied to the pendulum's swing : memory, narrative and temporality in Graham Greene's The End of the Affair by Gravdal, John
 
 
Tied to the Pendulum’s Swing 
 
 
Memory, Narrative and Temporality in Graham Greene’s 
 The End of the Affair 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
John Gravdal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A Thesis Presented to 
the Department of British and American Studies 
University of Oslo 
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements 
for the Cand. Philol. Degree 
Spring Term 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my sister Janne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks to: 
 
Jakob Lothe for productive guidance and for knocking this text into shape. 
 
My father for proof-reading the whole thing and for useful comments. 
 
Pål V. M. Pettersen for many thought-provoking discussions concerning Bakhtin. 
 
Kjartan Dannatt and Hanne Marit Paalerud for much-appreciated contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction         5 
      
 
 
Chapter 2: Preliminaries: Time and Space          20 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Memory and Narrative          39 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Memory, Temporality and God         69 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks          91 
 
 
 
References              97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Memory is like a long broken night. As I write, it is as though I am waking from sleep 
continually to grasp at an image which I hope may drag in its wake a whole intact dream, 
but the fragments remain fragments, the complete story always escapes.1
 
 
 
In the ‘Prelude’ to his profound study Memory and Narrative, James Olney puts his finger 
on one of the illustrative aspects of the twentieth-century writers. He claims ‘that an 
agonized search for the self, through the mutually reflexive acts of memory and narrative, 
accompanied by the haunting fear that it is impossible from the beginning but also 
impossible to give over, is the very emblem of our time’ (Olney 1998: xiv-xv). Olney’s is a 
study of the genre of autobiography, and thus it might seem remote to apply this quote as a 
point of departure in a discussion of Graham Greene’s novel The End of the Affair. As a 
novel, however, The End of the Affair displays many elements which are commonly 
thought of as belonging to the genre of autobiography, and as such I believe it is in keeping 
with Olney’s claim. The project and predicament Olney accentuates capture the mood and 
atmosphere of the novel under investigation here in a very succinct way. The main 
objective of this thesis will be to investigate, and hopefully illuminate, how memory and 
narrative are presented as two powerful complexes at work in this novel. 
 Born in 1904, Greene was thrown into what is widely regarded, at least in terms of 
European history, as one of the most violent and turbulent periods of all time. The wave of 
the First World War broke on the European continent with the gunshots in Sarajevo on 28 
June 1914, throwing its arms of impending doom around a disillusioned population. Nor 
did the interim period between the First and the Second War generate a sense of an 
optimistic outlook as the rise of fascism in its many various forms and the depression of 
                                                 
1 Graham Greene, A Sort of Life, p. 25. 
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the late twenties ravaged a bleeding Europe, rushing in a devilish speed towards that 
seemingly inevitable shadow looming in the future. But if the period was marked with 
material decay, it is also true that it had its counterpart in art and literature, which, partly 
because of the surrounding decline, sought new ways and forms of expressing existence. In 
terms of British literary history, never before had so many acclaimed writers flourished the 
scene in such a compressed time span as the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
Greene, who started his literary career in the late twenties, had the rather dubious honour 
of writing in the shadow of such precursors as Conrad, Eliot, Joyce and Woolf. 
Presumably, it must have been like writing in an impassable vacuum, but out of it turned a 
style highly distinct of its own. 
Looking back over the vast fields of Graham Greene’s entire production, one is at 
once struck by the number of works Greene managed to publish and the many different 
genres with which he engaged himself as a writer. As well as being the author of twenty-
five novels, he wrote six plays, several collections of short stories, four travel books, three 
books of autobiography, two of biography, four books for children and an extensive 
amount of essays and reviews. He was soon regarded a successful writer of compelling 
novels, appealing to an extensive readership, but the ‘sense of doom that lies over success,’ 
(Lambert 1994: 178) as he often put it, was always present to his mind. Many, myself 
included, regret that Greene never received the Nobel Prize for Literature, and perhaps it 
was this ghost, which often accompanies success, that finally played the decisive role. Of 
course, we will never know. These are merely speculations, and I am not so sure Greene 
regretted it as much as his adherents did, or do today. In an interview with Anthony 
Burgess, confronted with the question of when would he get the Nobel Prize, Greene 
replied: ‘Yes, I was asked that question by a Swedish journalist. How would you like the 
Nobel Prize? I said I look forward to getting a bigger prize than that.’ ‘Which one,’ says 
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Burgess. ‘Death. Let’s go and eat lunch…’ (Burgess 1994: 323). In April 1991 Greene was 
awarded his bigger prize, and among the many people who paid tribute to him on his death 
was William Golding: ‘Graham Greene was in a class by himself…He will be read and 
remembered as the ultimate chronicler of twentieth-century man’s consciousness and 
anxiety’ (Greene 1975: 1). 
 At quite an early age Greene came to view existence as boring and death as some 
kind of liberator. ‘Boredom is another word for depression’ (Heilpern 1994: 247), he once 
told John Heilpern. He spent his unhappy childhood and schooldays at Berkhamsted 
School where his father, Charles Greene, was the headmaster, soon finding himself in the 
midst of a conflict of loyalty between his schoolmates and his father. ‘I was like the son of 
a quisling in a country under occupation’ (Greene 1999: 54-55), he later recalled in his 
autobiography A Sort of Life (1971). When he later continued studies at Oxford, he played 
that dice with death invented by bored Russian officers at the turn of the century: Russian 
roulette. Later, travel replaced Russian roulette when he sought danger and death in 
countries in chaos and revolution:  
it was the fear of boredom which took me to Tabasco during the religious persecution, to a 
leproserie in the Congo, to the Kikuyu reserve during the Mau-Mau insurrection, to the 
emergency in Malaya and to the French war in Vietnam. There, in those last three regions 
of clandestine war, the fear of ambush served me just as effectively as the revolver from 
the corner-cupboard in the life-long war against boredom. (Heilpern 1994: 248-249) 
 
Greene’s was a life ‘on the dangerous edge’ of things. He lived his life ‘on the border,’ a 
perilous area, but an area which proved to be pregnant with artistic and literary inspiration. 
Some of the results of his extensive travelling are The Power and the Glory, The Heart of 
the Matter, The Comedians and The Quiet American.  
 Another element, besides the sense of a longing for death, which was part of 
Greene’s sentiment, and which became manifest in his artistic production, is what has 
become known as the religious dimension of Greene. At the age of twenty-two, three years 
before his first novel, The Man Within, was published, Greene converted to Catholicism. 
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‘And so faith came to me – shapelessly, without dogma, a presence above a croquet lawn, 
something associated with violence, cruelty, evil across the way. I began to believe in 
heaven because I believed in hell, but for a long time it was only hell I could picture with a 
certain intimacy’ (Greene 2002c: 14). Even though his faith did not manifest itself as an 
encouraging counterpoint to the seedy life surrounding him, it provided Greene with a 
certain measure of a fixed value, albeit represented ‘negatively’ by the idea of hell. It 
became a distinguished element of his works, particularly the works often referred to as his 
Catholic novels: Brighton Rock, The Power and the Glory, The Heart of the Matter and 
The End of the Affair. The element was recognised by critics as idiosyncratically Greenean, 
and Greene was soon to be labelled a Catholic writer. Greene himself disapproved strongly 
of such an epithet, repeatedly claiming he was not a Catholic writer, but a writer who 
happened to be a Catholic. Nevertheless, he made a claim for the value of a ‘religious 
sense’ in literature. It was something he had admired in the nineteenth-century novelists 
and especially in Henry James.2 ‘I think the religious sense does emphasise the importance 
of the human act. It’s not Catholicism, it’s simply a faith in the possibility that we have 
eternal importance. A religious sense makes the individual more important and therefore it 
helps to put the character on the page’ (Dennys 1994: 277), he once told Louise Dennys. 
 Among the four Catholic novels listed above, The End of the Affair differs quite 
distinctly from the others in that the story is told from a first-person perspective. To apply 
narrative perspectives as a ground for comparison of the novels might at first seem too 
narrow an approach. However, in my opinion, it makes a significant difference, 
particularly when considering the religious dimension of the novels. According to 
Grahame Smith, the difficulty for the novel of belief is that ‘[g]eneralisations on matters of 
dogma are liable to provoke a disabling failure of communication between author and 
                                                 
2 In his essay ‘Henry James: The Religious Aspect’, Greene says it is the ‘religious sense’ which saves 
James’s novels from ‘deepest cynicism’ and lends the ‘importance of the supernatural’ to the struggle 
between the ‘beautiful and the treacherous’ (Greene 1969a: 50). 
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reader. And they may also tempt the writer into an ultimately delusive ease of statement 
instead of the attempt to embody his beliefs in dialogue, character and action’ (Smith 1986: 
107). I can only agree with Smith that the employment of the first-person narrative 
technique eases, if not completely, the difficulty of such generalisation. Thus, I believe it is 
fair to claim that the religious generalisations of The End of the Affair are much easier 
accepted than they are in the other novels, for believers as well as non-believers.   
 Another fascinating aspect of the first-person narrative is how it, more often than 
not, demands from the reader additional interpretative efforts since he has to implicate the 
narrative voice as one of the most significant elements of the story and the discourse. 
Furthermore, in literature, the first-person narration is frequently accompanied by what 
narratology has termed the frame of the narrative, and likewise, it demands special critical 
attention in an analysis of the text. In an examination of The End of the Affair it is therefore 
intriguing to investigate how the frame and the narrative voice contribute to the overall 
thematics of the novel. Having read the novel carefully numerous times, it has become 
increasingly clear to me, to use the words of Conrad’s frame narrator in Heart of Darkness, 
that the meaning of the story is ‘not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale 
which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty 
halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine’ (Conrad 
1995: 18). 
 A story ‘does not expend itself,’ says Walter Benjamin, ‘[i]t preserves and 
concentrates its strength and is capable of releasing it even after a long time’ (Benjamin 
2000: 16).  Up to the mid eighties, most of the criticism on Greene adhered to a more or 
less thematic emphasis, with a particular interest in his religious and political 
preoccupations. Much of this criticism has partly pertained to what I understand as taking 
sides. In particular, as regards the religious dimension of Greene, several critics have found 
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it important to accentuate whether this mythical element is plausible or not. However, as 
theories of narrative have established themselves on the critical arena in recent decades, a 
number of critics have tried to investigate the formal artistry of the novels. It is 
nevertheless a fact that there has been a critical bias towards the former, creating, in my 
opinion, an unsound imbalance in Greene criticism. Unquestionably, part of the reason for 
this is Greene’s putatively conventional fictional technique. It has often been more 
intriguing for narratologists to apply their theories on such writers as Joyce, Woolf and 
Faulkner, just to mention a few. It is fair to claim, I believe, that to literary historical 
criticism with its unspoken evolutionist bias, Greene has not offered himself as the most 
intriguing ‘specimen.’  
To make it explicit, it is not one of the aims of this thesis to argue a position for 
Greene among such formal innovators as those listed above. Since I intend only to 
investigate The End of the Affair as a more or less isolated novel, such a project is excluded 
by its own. Obviously, critics have a point when they maintain Greene’s is a comparably 
less unconventional fictional technique, but it does not follow that an exploration of the 
formal properties of the novel is necessarily deemed futile. In terms of the two approaches 
above, the approach of this thesis will fall somewhere in between the two, although with a 
slightly stronger emphasis on the latter. There is a need also to specify that, to the extent in 
which it is possible, this thesis will abstain from what I above called taking sides. The 
present approach will be less concerned with the religious content as an expression of a 
Greenean metaphysics with which we can disagree or not. Rather, it will be an 
investigation into the concepts of memory and narrative as they run parallel with, and 
generate, the metaphysics of the novel at hand.  
From the beginning of man, memory and narrative have formed two of the most 
vital elements of existence. There have never been stories without the existence of 
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memory, and never memories without stories; the two complexes are curiously 
intertwined. Before written language, for instance, it is a general fact that people recited, 
out of a ‘collective’ memory, stories and tales which proceeded from generation to 
generation. In this early ongoing swirl of recitation to storage in memory, and then back to 
recitation again, the pillars of culture found their dawning expression. The picture of today 
is still the same, only with the exception that we now are privileged of having a written 
language. Our existence, as well, is dependent on memory and narrative and particularly on 
three levels. First, we are endowed with a ‘collective’ memory which, broadly speaking, 
comprises the discipline of history. Out of this memory, we are, to the extent possible, able 
to define mankind and the various societal parts comprising it. Second, we are inheritors of 
fictional stories, handed to us either as written or spoken, which constitute a kind of 
cultural memory which allows us to set apart one culture from others. The British, the 
Norwegian and the Ethiopian cultural memories, for example, are to various degrees 
dissimilar from one another, and as such, they have partly generated different cultures. 
If the two levels above are marked with a collective touch, the third level is highly 
individual. As human beings we use content stored in memory to define our own selves 
and to make existence meaningful. This is only accomplished by using the narrative 
scheme, as the American psychologist Polkinghorne sees it: ‘Narrative meaning functions 
to give form to the understanding of a purpose to life and to join everyday actions and 
events into episodic units. It provides a framework for understanding the past events of 
one’s life and for planning future actions. It is the primary scheme by means of which 
human existence is rendered meaningful’ (Polkinghorne 1988: 11). In summary, then, 
memory and narrative pervade human existence in such a forceful and manifest way that it 
is easy to forget and neglect problems attached to the tangled and symbiotic nature of the 
two phenomena. Somehow, we often take their significance for granted. Fortunately, 
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however, problematic areas have not escaped the scrutiny of philosophy, psychology and 
literature. In various fashions those disciplines have tried to describe and delineate what 
they perceive as problematic aspects in connection with memory and narrative. As I 
address problems of the two terms in The End of the Affair, I shall in the main draw on 
narratology, but wherever I find it suitable, I shall highlight my discussion with elements 
from both philosophy and psychology. Now, however, I believe it is in order with a more 
detailed outline of the approach and the objectives of this thesis.  
The objective of this thesis could roughly be said to be threefold, although it should 
be noted that the three parts interlink in very exact ways. In the first place, the thesis 
intends to investigate how memory and narrative are problematised as two complexes in 
the life of the protagonist and narrator of the novel, Maurice Bendrix. Memory and 
narrative are first and foremost intriguing because the story Bendrix tells is a self-
experienced story narrated from a retrospective point of view. The discourse of the novel is 
continually jumping back and forth between the past of the embedded story and the present 
of the frame when the writing takes place. Each time the narrator writes about his present 
situation, he seems to engage himself in a dialogue with himself on this or that subject 
which relates in a specific way to the mutual acts of memorising and narrating. The present 
of Bendrix’s situation comprises a situation of chaos, and I shall argue that memory and 
narrative are, to a significant extent, the causes for this. Applying St. Augustine’s 
definition of memory, ‘the present of things past’ (Olney 1998: 7), I want to show how 
memory confronts Bendrix as a faculty which is not necessarily an expression of truth 
statements. For Bendrix, the problem is further enhanced when memory is transferred to a 
narrative form where language lacks the necessary transparency in order to depict the 
exactness of time and existence. As memory and narrative appear increasingly 
problematic, it is clear that Bendrix adopts a sceptical attitude towards them. However, this 
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scepticism cannot prevent him from continuing writing since all he has left, I will argue, is 
exactly memory, and this leads us to the second part of the thesis’s objective. 
By addressing aspects such as Bendrix’s motivation for writing his story and the 
particular genre of what he is writing, I aim to show that memory is the only existential 
motivator left in an ongoing fight with the transcendental. On the most obvious level, 
Bendrix’s account is a kind of autobiographical story which comprises an extensive period 
of his lived adult life, but when we investigate it further, a much more complicated and 
paradoxical picture appears. I shall argue that his story is at once a humble attempt to 
accumulate knowledge of the past, a diatribe against both time and God, and not least, a 
rather unconventional kind of confession which is accompanied by a sincere wish to atone. 
In much the same fashion as Bendrix’s attitude towards his lover Sarah is continually 
shifting between love and hatred, so is his relation with God marked with a dichotomously 
arranged pattern of the same two extremes. Bendrix has come to an acknowledgement of, 
and a belief in, the powers of God. However, the recognition of God has not lead Bendrix 
to a situation of ease and relief, rather, it has left him in what he perceives as being a 
terrible, but unavoidable, predicament. He finds himself on a battlefield where he fights for 
his belief in human free will against his pressing doubt that there, after all, is no such thing, 
but only an infinite tide of divine predetermination. Within this vacuum, memory and 
narrative emerge as his only weapons against a God who intervenes in human affairs. 
Through memory he seeks to see himself as a self-defined entity independent of God, and 
by narrating the past he attempts to control time, for if he can control time, he must be the 
creator of his own self, and per definition self-defined. Nevertheless, he realises that his 
two weapons are only futile projects in the passing of time. 
The third aspect this thesis intends to address is how memory comprises the 
structural and thematic centre of the embedded narrative. A rough delineation of the plot of 
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the embedded narrative is how the protagonist moves from a position as a disbeliever to a 
position as a believer. This transition, I shall argue, takes place in the psychic space of 
memory. In a comparable way to St Augustine’s claim that memory is the location where 
human beings can perceive God, this thesis will try to show how memory constitutes the 
ground where Bendrix finds God. In a very specific way, this relates to the workings of 
external space, and in particular to the temporal quality inherent in space. In an encounter 
with space, memory triggers different temporalities, and in Bendrix’s case, these memories 
are always memories of Sarah and, in the final analysis, of God. Concluding that God 
stands at the centre of his memory, I shall discuss how this aspect extends into the frame 
narrative and puts Bendrix in yet another predicament, namely his simultaneous longing 
for and postponing of death. 
Commenting on the methodology of this thesis, I will do so by first applying one of 
Bakhtin’s simple illustrations: that of two people facing each other in a room.3 Person A 
can see things behind person B’s back which B cannot see, whereas B can see things 
behind A’s back which are denied to A’s vision. The things A sees behind B’s back 
comprise the horizon of A, and what B sees behind A’s back, the horizon of B. Although 
the two are essentially doing the same thing, they do it from different places; although they 
partake in the same event, that event is unique for both of them. Their places are different 
not only because their bodies occupy different positions in exterior physical space, but also 
because they regard the world and each other from distinct centres in cognitive time and 
space. Through the medium of language the two can engage themselves in a dialogue 
which enables them to construct the whole or the unity of their joint existence.  
The analogy to an encounter between a literary text and a reader should be pretty 
straightforward. The basic difference, however, is that the literary text does not constitute 
                                                 
3 Bakhtin employs this illustration repeatedly in his works. Michael Holquist summarises it aptly in his 
Dialogism, pp. 36-37. 
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an active part in this dialogic encounter; rather, it is being activated by the encounter with 
its historical reader. Language is still the medium, through which the dialogic exchange of 
meaning takes place, and both the exterior physical space and time and the cognitive space 
and time play significant roles in this encounter. Of course, by these spatial and temporal 
dimensions I mean the historical settings of the reader and his cognitive position in terms 
of how he conceives of the world and existence. I shall return to this shortly, but first I 
want to look at some general problematic aspects in the theoretical framework. 
In the last half of the twentieth century much theoretical work was concerned with 
whether meaning is situated in a literary work, ready to be extracted from its textual fabric 
as the ‘author’s meaning,’ or whether meaning is generated only in the interactive process 
of experiencing the work. Personally, I take a stance somewhere in between the two 
extremes. I am thoroughly convinced there is no such thing as the ‘author’s meaning’ only, 
and if that were the case, criticism would demand from us either to question the historical 
author, assuming he is alive and willing to answer, or to investigate his diaries, letters and 
so on, for evidence of what he intended. I cannot think of anything less inspiring than such 
a conception of meaning in literature. For me, literature is alive and generative; I cannot 
swallow the idea that a reader’s contribution to a text is completely unimportant and 
irrelevant. As readers, each of us brings to a narrative a different set of experiences and 
expectations, and it seems fair to claim that differences in interpretation can be derived 
from differences in personal experience and social understanding. However, it is also clear 
to me that works of literature do not come into being by accident: 
They are intentional acts, produced by individual writers employing shared codes of 
signification according to a certain design, weighing and measuring the interrelation of part 
to part and parts to the developing whole, projecting the work against the anticipated 
response of a hypothetical reader. Without such control and design there would be no 
reason to write one sentence rather than another, or to arrange one’s sentences in any 
particular order. (Lodge 1990: 158) 
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The basic structural and thematic premises are already there when we encounter a 
narrative, but within those premises there is plenty of room for personal creativity in the 
construction of meaning. 
 As I return to the illustration above, I want to make it explicit that I find it at once 
both liberating and problematic to be a historical reader of my chosen text. By reasons just 
explained, my personal involvement with the text is legitimate and sustained, and I find it 
highly inspiring to encounter the text from my cognitive position in time and space. Yet, it 
is also problematic if I, as a historical reader, cannot argue a position for myself as the 
implied reader of the text. In methodological terms, this predicament is only solved by 
continually substantiating my claims with evidence from the primary text. Thus, I shall, to 
the extent of my abilities, let The End of the Affair speak for itself. However, similarly to 
the horizon behind each of the two persons in Bakhtin’s illustration, there is, figuratively 
speaking, a horizon behind the novel under investigation here. By horizon, I understand a 
background of possibilities which can participate in, and thus contribute to, my dialogue 
with the text in a generative way. In the rough, those comprise other critics’ observations 
on The End of the Affair and on Greene in general, different literary and narrative theories 
and elements from theories in philosophy and psychology. My approach towards memory 
and narrative in Greene’s novel is to some extent interdisciplinary, although the emphasis 
is markedly on narratology. All the elements constituting the horizon are chosen with the 
specific intention of highlighting my discussion of the novel. To some length, they might 
be arbitrarily chosen, but as long as they serve to illuminate the discussion my application 
of them should be sustained. 
 To my knowledge, little criticism on The End of the Affair has been focused on how 
memory and narrative work as manifest complexes on the different levels of the story. 
Naturally, comments and observations on the two terms have been made in connection 
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with other approaches to the text, but there is still much unexplored territory left. If that 
were not the case, my approach to the novel would still be valid, I believe. As a story, The 
End of the Affair has not expended itself, to recall Benjamin’s words, and if I did not 
believe I could bring a personal touch to my dialogue with that novel, I would never have 
taken on the project in the first place. I can only concur with Bakhtin that 
there is neither a first word nor a last word. The contexts of dialogue are without limit. 
They extend into the deepest past and the most distant future. Even meanings born in 
dialogues of the remotest past will never be finally grasped once and for all, for they will 
always be renewed in later dialogue. At any present moment of the dialogue there are great 
masses of forgotten meanings, but these will be recalled again at a given moment in the 
dialogue’s later course when it will be given new life. For nothing is absolutely dead: every 
meaning will someday have its homecoming festival. (Holquist 2002: 39) 
 
This thesis does not purport to be a ‘homecoming festival,’ but it is nevertheless my 
humble hope that it will provide its readers with some additional intriguing thoughts to the 
amount already existing. This thesis is an interpretation of The End of the Affair, and as 
every interpretive approach it  
reveals something only by disguising something else, which a competing method with 
different assumptions might disclose. Every hermeneutic standpoint has its own dialectic of 
blindness and insight – a ratio of disguise and disclosure which stems from its 
presuppositions. To accept a method of interpretation is to enter into a wager – to gamble, 
namely, that the insights made possible by its assumption will offset the risks of blindness 
they entail. (Armstrong 1990: 7) 
 
One of the difficulties with my approach to the novel is that the different facets of 
memory and narrative interlink in very particular ways, and yet I need to discuss them as if 
they were separate. As I proceed, I shall try to remind my readers of this linkage, and 
finally in the concluding chapter I shall hopefully be able to bring most of these aspects up 
to the surface and comment on how they relate to one another. I have chosen to divide the 
main part of this thesis into three chapters, and some brief comments on the content and 
proceeding of each chapter are now in order. 
The second chapter of this thesis concerns in the main some general observations 
on time and space in The End of the Affair. Some of the important terms I will investigate 
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in this chapter are anachrony, memory, reflective space, dichotomy and experiential 
temporality. They will comprise the ground for the discussion which follows in the next 
two chapters. First, in a comparable way to much modernist literature, the novel displays 
an obsessive preoccupation with time. I shall start exploring its temporal structure by 
applying the Russian formalist concepts of fabula and sjuzet, linking them to the workings 
of memory. Second, I want to show how the spatial settings of the story have crucial 
artistic significance in terms of what I see as their reflective quality. The Second World 
War with its surrounding periods of peace and ‘the pursuit’ are external images, mirroring 
the interior actions of the characters. Additionally, space works to underscore the 
dichotomous prevalence of the novel. Third, time will be spent on what I have chosen to 
call experiential temporality, and by that I understand how the characters conceive of time. 
Attention will, in particular, be given to the juxtaposition of Bendrix’s and Sarah’s ways of 
regarding time. Sarah, I shall argue, seems to relish the present, whereas Bendrix 
desperately tries to avoid and control it. 
My third chapter, ‘Memory & Narrative,’ will investigate how memory and 
narrative are presented as problematic complexes in the life of the writing protagonist. 
Doing so, I shall first perform a close reading of the novel’s opening. This is not only 
intriguing because it is one of the most fascinating openings I have encountered in 
literature, but also because the concept of beginning relates in a very peculiar way to 
memory. Besides commenting on the two opening paragraphs, I shall try to elucidate the 
title, the epigraph and the dedication of the novel and look at how those elements also 
connect with memory and narrative. Furthermore, I shall extract from the text elements and 
piece them together in order to reach an understanding of what Bendrix is writing and the 
underlying reasons which motivate this writing. This chapter will also start to investigate 
the function of God in the novel and address the existential opposition which is set up 
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between human free will and divine predetermination. Finally, I want to show that, even 
though memory and narrative confront Bendrix as problematic existential dimensions, 
memory is the only driving force left in his life, and that narrative is the only medium 
through which he can express himself. 
Chapter four, which I have titled ‘Memory, Temporality and God,’ will explore 
how memory comprises the thematic and structural centre of both the embedded narrative 
and the frame. By applying two of Bakhtin’s ‘chronotopes of the novel’, the chronotope of 
the road and the chronotope of threshold, I aim to show how the former is the organising 
centre for the overall structure of The End of the Affair, and the latter is the organising 
centre for the embedded narrative. The elements comprising the embedded story present 
themselves to Bendrix as encounters on the roads of memory, and it is a construction the 
reader of the novel must make and keep in mind while reading. The embedded narrative is 
structured as an interior route towards the protagonist’s recognition of God. Bendrix finds 
God in memory, I shall argue, and a particular reason for this is the metonymical workings 
of space. More time will also be spent on God as a character in the novel, as he appears as 
Bendrix’s superior in every way. Finally, I will look at the dialectics between movement 
and stasis, as it is an expression of Bendrix’s predicament and the novel’s overarching 
sentiment. It is with this aspect in mind I have chosen to title this thesis ‘Tied to the 
Pendulum’s Swing.’ 
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Chapter 2: Preliminaries: Time and Space 
 
 
 
 
 
The Greenean ‘Pattern’ and a Modernist Detour 
 
 
Until 1958 Greene made a distinction between his novels, classifying some of them as 
novels and the others as entertainments. Although his so-called entertainments are not 
altogether unlike his serious novels, it is typical that they are markedly identifiable by the 
emphasis on outward action, a comparatively less sustained sense of development in the 
characters and a pervasive use of melodramatic devices. ‘The denomination, 
“entertainment” does suggest a relaxation of serious purpose’ (Kulshrestha 1977: 179). ‘In 
the minor works,’ says Salvatore, referring to Greene’s entertainments, ‘plot seems to 
dominate, and moral, religious, or artistic questions, while often present, tend to recede in 
importance as the reader’s attention generally becomes focused more superficially on what 
is happening rather than on why…situation, in other words, takes precedence over 
perplexing subtleties of motivation or self-development’ (Salvatore 1988: xv-xvi). Contrary 
to the more intricate stories and themes in the major novels, which raise essential questions 
to ponder, the entertainments follow more consistently a pattern of suspense and then relief 
which leads to an easily accepted denouement, making the reader, to an extensive degree, 
less likely to get involved.  
In the preface to Three Plays, Greene examines his engagement with the two 
‘types’ of novels: ‘The strain of writing a novel, which keeps the author confined for a 
period of years with his depressive self, is extreme, and I have always sought relief in 
“entertainments” – for melodrama as much as farce is an expression of a manic mood’ 
(Greene 1961b: xiii). Considering Greene’s oeuvre from a vantage point, one is tempted to 
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claim that this staggering, as it were, between serious novels and entertainments is firmly 
rooted in the writer’s conscious or unconscious mind. The duality of his mind and writing 
– on the one hand, the entertaining aspect manifested through suspense and plot, and, on 
the other, for loss of a better term, what we could call the investigation into the truth of 
existence – seems, from a psychoanalytical point of view, to have evolved from his early 
childhood. ‘Perhaps it is only in childhood that books have any deep influence on our lives. 
In later life we admire, we are entertained, we may modify some views we already hold, 
but we are more likely to find in books merely a confirmation of what is in our minds 
already: as in a love affair it is our own features that we see reflected flatteringly back’ 
(Greene 1969b: 13). In this often-quoted essay, ‘The Lost Childhood’, Greene explains 
how Allan Quatermain’s King Solomon’s Mines (1886) and Majorie Bowen’s The Viper of 
Milan (1906) influenced him, and how the two writers thus had equipped him with a 
pattern for his future writing; namely the duality described above. Ultimately, in this 
respect, the interesting point about Greene’s fiction is that while his entertainments, or 
thrillers, ‘have an edge over most other specimens of the genre inasmuch as they have 
intellectual glamour, psychological interest and the air of social and moral questionings’ 
(Kulshrestha 1977: 179), his serious novels are potentially idiosyncratic in their 
exploitation of paraphernalia typically associated with the thriller genre. Making use of 
such paraphernalia paved the way for introducing subjects and themes which normally 
would not excite an extensive readership. ‘[I]f you excite your audience first, you can put 
over what you will of horror, suffering, truth. This is still true and applies to the novel as 
well as to the film. By exciting the audience I mean getting them involved in the story. 
Once they are involved they will accept the thing as you present it,’ Greene claimed in a 
1969 interview (Phillips 1994: 206). The novel under scrutiny here is certainly not an 
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exception to the rule, in its serious treatment of a love-hate relationship which unfolds in 
the wake of a detective’s investigation. 
Further, one could claim that The End of the Affair is one of Greene’s most 
‘modernist’ novels; of course, only to the extent that such labels as ‘realist’ and 
‘modernist’, in their broadest senses, are relevant and potentially fruitful. For instance, it is 
generally acknowledged that the novel bears a distinct resemblance to Ford Madox Ford’s 
The Good Soldier (1915) both in terms of subject and structure. ‘[It] is the most Jamesian 
of Greene’s novels,’ claims one critic, in its use of ‘modernist’ devices such as ‘the 
sceptical narrator, stream-of –consciousness technique, flashback, diary, interior reverie 
[and] spiritual debate’ (DeVitis 1987: 88). Indeed, when treading in this Harold Bloomian 
area, Greene would probably not object to or disclaim the almost too-apparent affinity with 
such writers. In a 1960 interview with the French Madeleine Chapsal, responding to the 
question of whom he admired as storytellers, Greene promptly replied ‘Henry James, 
Joseph Conrad and a writer who is not well known, Ford Madox Ford’ (Chapsal 1994: 
145). As every writer and every new generation of writers must do, Greene and the writers 
of the thirties had to engage themselves in the Oedipal struggle of sons and their literary 
fathers in order to create something different; always being conscious of the marks and 
traces their daunting precursors left on their works. The novel’s kinship to modernist 
literature should therefore sustain reasons for looking at different cultural and 
philosophical aspects in fashion during the modernist era. 
 In The End of the Affair one of these traces is the novel’s almost obsessive 
preoccupation with time, an obsession which, to a considerable degree, is comparable to 
the modernist treatment of time. Albert Einstein’s special (1905) and general (1916) 
theories of relativity had not only implied a paradigm shift in the natural sciences, they had 
also sparked a comparable paradigm shift in artistic articulation. His theories were 
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welcomed and embraced by the new generation of writers who found scientific support for 
their ideas of individual perspective. Peter Childs points out that the ‘tendency towards 
narrative relativity, before and after Einstein, is perhaps the most striking aspect to 
Modernist fiction, from Conrad and James to Proust and Woolf, in its use of perspective, 
unreliability, anti-absolutism, instability, individuality and subjective perceptions’ (Childs 
2000: 66). Here one could add terms such as narrative and experiential temporality, or, 
even better, one could recognise that these are inextricably linked with the terms listed by 
Childs. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall explore the temporal and spatial structure of 
The End of the Affair, and start to link them to memory. Finally, I will spend some time 
looking into what I have called experiential temporalities. This chapter concerns 
preliminaries on time and space which will comprise a point of departure for the more in-
depth analyses which follow in the next two chapters. 
 
Memory and the Fabula and the Sjuzet 
 
 
A potentially rewarding starting point when investigating time and space in The End of the 
Affair is to look at the temporal and spatial structure of the work. The Russian formalists 
made a clear distinction between what they called the fabula and the sjuzet of narrative. 
‘The fabula is the raw material, the basic story stuff, the story as it would have been 
enacted in real time and space. The sjuzet is the actual narrative text in which the story is 
represented, with all the gaps, elisions, rearrangements, selections and distortions involved 
in that process’ (Lodge 1990: 147). The radical rearrangement of the spatio-temporal 
continuity of the narrative line, as it appears in The End of the Affair, would by the Russian 
formalists be described as the deformation of the fabula in the sjuzet. Maurice Bendrix, a 
professional writer who ‘has been praised for his technical ability’ and is the narrator and 
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protagonist of this ‘record of hate’ (7), sets out to construct, out of memory, his love affair 
with the married Sarah Miles, from the beginning to what he calls ‘the end of love’ (68). It 
is a story that covers the years from 1939, when Bendrix began ‘to write a story with a 
senior civil servant as the main character’ (10), to 1946, and the so-called sjuzet reminds 
one of a metaphorical comment Bendrix gives on Mrs Bertram’s way of conversing; it is 
‘like the tube system. It [moves] in circles and loops’ (162). Take, for example, the 
opening chapter, which, in matters of action, runs a course as following: 1) on a January 
night in 1946 Bendrix sees Henry Miles, 2) while walking towards him we get a relatively 
short flashback to 1944 and the destructions of the war, 3) conversation between Bendrix 
and Henry, 4) a flahback to 1939 when Bendrix got acquainted with the Mileses, 5) an 
episode a little later where Bendrix and Sarah had spent the night together, 6) back to the 
conversation, and so it continues throughout the chapter and the book, constantly 
rearranging the temporal and spatial elements of the fabula. Mainly because of the little 
clues Greene skilfully has placed here and there in the text, an attentive reader will 
encounter little problems when reconstructing the fabula out of the sjuzet. 
 One of the plausible reasons for this rearrangement may be that the text itself more 
or less explicitly expresses the workings of a mind in the act of memorising. It is of crucial 
importance that we notice that around three years have passed from the last events in the 
novel to Bendrix’s act of actually putting it down to paper. Bendrix is therefore writing his 
story in 1949: ‘I have a vague memory now, after three years have passed’ (19). Again, I 
think ideas and idiosyncrasies in fashion during the modernist period may provide some 
useful insight into the discussion, and will therefore, before looking at particular instances 
in The End of the Affair, pay attention to some essential aspects of the thinking of the 
French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Already in 1890, the year after Bergson’s 
dissertation, Samuel Alexander hailed him as the ‘first philosopher to take time seriously’ 
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(Kern 1983: 33), and it is beyond doubt that his ideas were well known and established in 
British literary circles during the second decade of the twentieth century.4 Bergson made a 
clear distinction between the concept and experience of time. Opposed to the specialised 
conception of time, measured by a clock, which is employed by science, durée (Bergson 
calls it) is time presented to consciousness as an endlessly flowing process. Bergson’s main 
claim was that a discreteness of experienced time is not real, and that we ‘start from the 
experience of temporal flow. Temporal structure is not a matter of putting together given 
discrete items. On the contrary, so-called discrete elements are only apparent when we 
have a need to pluck them from our continuing experience’ (Moore 1996: 55, original 
emphasis). As it is with a piece of music, ‘any moment of consciousness is a synthesis of 
an ever changing past and future’ (Kern 1983: 24), and if past were annihilated from 
moment to moment, thought would surely be annihilated with it. 
 It seems sensible to claim that memory, in the broadest sense of the term, to a great 
extent incorporates many of these ideas and indeed pervades the novel from beginning to 
end. When Bendrix leaves his lodgings ‘for a drink at the local’ at the second page of the 
novel, a memory from 1944 is triggered: ‘I closed the stained-glass door behind me and 
made my way carefully down the steps that had been blasted in 1944 and never repaired. I 
had reason to remember the occasion and how the stained glass, tough and ugly and 
Victorian, stood up to the shock as our grandfathers themselves would have done’ (8). 
Although this extract is an important proleptic allusion to one of the major incidents in the 
novel, and is therefore not elaborated on here – such an elaboration would run at the 
expense of the plot – it still underscores a vital proposition implicit in the story; namely 
that the spatial incorporates different temporalities. To put it slightly different, space 
becomes metonymical of different temporalities, not just a representation of the here and 
                                                 
4 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, pp. 37-47. Here, Levenson points out how T.E. Hulme returned to 
England as a Bergsonian. 
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now. When I investigate memory more in depth in my fourth chapter, we shall see that this 
proposition takes on crucial importance as it partly leads Bendrix to a belief in God. 
 It is intriguing to notice that, even though the story is narrated in the past tense, 
there exists a kind of present in the story, starting from Bendrix’s meeting with Henry in 
1946, and it should alert us at once that we are dealing with a self-consciously skilful 
narrator whose manipulation of time is a reminder ‘not only of his presence’ in the book 
‘but especially of his prowess’ as an author (Salvatore 1988: 38). To take the example 
above, if one accepts that there exists such a present side by side with the present of 
Bendrix’s actually writing it, one sees the contours of the temporal complexities. The 
blasted stairs from 1944 are simultaneously pointing backwards to a past and forwards to a 
‘future’ relative to the present of the story. Thus the scene is both analeptic and proleptic, 
but whereas the former is analeptic in terms of the fabula, the latter is proleptic in terms of 
the sjuzet.  
The realisation of the two presents and the manipulating narrator adds a further 
problem to the discussion of memory. Necessarily, one needs to confront the questions: 
whose memory are we reading? Is it Bendrix, present as the character in the action, or 
Bendrix, present as the writer/narrator of the action, who is responsible for the temporal 
fluidity of the memory sections? There are, arguably, no straightforward answers to the 
questions. It is quite clear from the outset that in sections where Bendrix’s discourse is 
marked off with the present tense, we see Bendrix, the author, self-consciously aware of 
himself as the narrator of the story, but in a majority of sections there seems to be a blend 
of the two. Obviously, Bendrix, the writer, makes his voice heard in these sections, first 
and foremost in order to generate suspense and mystery, the ‘what happens next?’ and the 
‘what happened in the past, and why?’ (Lodge 1990: 146), respectively. Here, it is worth 
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repeating that we are dealing with a narrator who basks in the glory of having been 
‘praised for his technical ability’ (7).  
In addition, it is important to recognise that one of the reasons lying behind this 
subtle blending of ‘voices,’ or temporal dialectics, is that Bendrix, the author, strives 
continually not to give himself too much away. He is in many ways a reflection of the 
Dickensian Mr Parkis, the detective with ‘gentle apologetic eyes’ (36), who is hired by 
Bendrix to provide him with information on Sarah and her presumptive lover(s). Greene 
certainly invites us to discover and ponder that Bendrix’s act of writing is analogous to Mr 
Parkis’s detection. When, for instance, Mr Parkis brings Sarah’s diary to Bendrix, he 
delivers a sensitive and critically astute comment on the diary, a comment which stretches 
further than its textual surroundings and points to narration in general: ‘Of course, she may 
be very cautious, but my experience of diaries is they always give things away. People 
invent their little codes, but you soon see through them, sir. Or they leave out things, but 
you soon learn what they leave out’ (85). Bendrix has invented his little codes so that he is 
able to fuse his present voice with his voice as a character partaking in the plot, or as Mr 
Parkis would have put it; ‘for purposes of concealment’ (36). But Bendrix, for all his 
acclaim as a writer, is human and, like Mr Parkis, he has his share of ‘floaters’ (41), 
figuratively speaking. ‘It isn’t, when you come to think of it,’ he says at one instance, ‘a 
quite respectable trade, the detection of the innocent, for aren’t lovers nearly always 
innocent?’ (23). In matter of seconds he has forgotten what he has just written a couple of 
pages before, and thereby undermined the respectability of his own profession. In 
connection with how he got acquainted with Sarah and Henry, he writes: 
Henry James once, in a discussion with Walter Besant, said that a young woman with 
sufficient talent need only pass the mess-room windows of a Guard’s barracks and look 
inside in order to write a novel about the Brigade, but I think at some stage of her book she 
would have found it necessary to go to bed with a Guardsman if only in order to check on 
the details. I didn’t exactly go to bed with Henry, but I did the next best thing, and the first 
night I took Sarah out to dinner I had the cold-blooded intention of picking the brain of a 
civil servant’s wife. (10) 
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Ultimately, it all adds to show that no narration is neutral. Although Bendrix is ‘writing 
against the bias because it is [his] professional pride to prefer the near-truth, even to the 
expression of [his] near-hate’ (7), it is clear that he is ‘lost in a strange region. [He has] no 
map’ and has doubts ‘whether anything that [he is] putting down here is true’ (50). A 
possible reading is to see memory as this strange region. Memory is selective and, one is 
tempted to say, seductive in its temporal fluidity, and it certainly never follows any 
already-drawn routes on a map. To use one of Greene’s own titles, which somehow bears a 
significant kinship to the internal Conradian descent, memory is a journey without maps. 
 
War, Peace and the Pursuit: a Matter of Reflective Space and Dichotomy 
 
 
Since we have just touched upon Conrad, it may be worth mentioning that in contrast to 
the typical Conradian story, which so often dialogises an interior narrative with a political 
one, The End of the Affair does not purport to display such an interplay. In his Conradian 
reading of Greene’s fiction, Robert Pendleton disclaims the novel’s premise as a realistic 
novel because of its ‘monological insistence on the Catholic processes of faith and doubt’ 
(Pendleton 1996: 97, italics mine). Now, let us agree with Pendleton for a while on the 
monologic aspect he points to. There are certainly no socio-political implications/themes in 
the novel, such as would later appear in novels like The Quiet American (1955) and A 
Burnt-Out Case (1961). However, the absence of a political narrative, co-existing with the 
interior, should not make us altogether disregard the socio-political environment of The 
End of the Affair. After all, it has at least two important functions. 
 First, the environment has major implications for the development of the plot. To 
see this, we need only consider one of the most significant episodes of the novel, the 
climatic scene in terms of the mystery, when Bendrix and Sarah spend together the ‘first 
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night of what were later called the V1s in June 1944’ (69). As Bendrix descends the stairs, 
one of the V1s explodes nearby and blasts the front door, throwing it towards Bendrix, 
who gets totally knocked out by the impact. Sarah finds him under the door, thoroughly 
convinced he is dead, and consequently she starts praying to the God she does not believe 
in to give Bendrix back his life in return of a promise to believe in Him.  
 Secondly, and arguably more important, the environment functions as a spatial, 
external image of the interior conflicts going on in Bendrix’s and Sarah’s minds. 
According to Michael Levenson, ‘part of every fiction is physis, the elaboration of an 
external space, and part is psyche, the construction of an internal psychological space’ 
(Levenson 1984: 7), and it is fair to claim that in The End of the Affair these two literally 
converge. Following the fabula, the relationship between the two lovers starts in 1939, a 
year characterised by a fragile and disconcerting peace, but a peace where ‘hope’ still is 
part of the vocabulary. ‘We had started – that was the point. There was the whole of life to 
look forward to then’ (45). But the shadow of the war closes in on them and the spring of 
1940, ‘like a corpse was sweet with the smell of doom’ (57), suggest the destructive 
direction their relationship has taken. Bendrix even comes to regard the ‘war as a rather 
disreputable and unreliable accomplice in [his] affair’ (57). And, surely, it is unreliable: ‘A 
week ago I revisited the terrace,’ ponders Bendrix, ‘Half of it was gone – the half where 
the hotels used to stand had been blasted to bits, and the place where we made love that 
night was a patch of air’ (44). The war as the eraser of space reflects the loss Bendrix has 
experienced – the solid is reduced to a ‘patch of air.’ Finally, their relationship ends, the 
war ends, and an enormous vacuum, a status quo, a peace of unrest, filled with unanswered 
questions, enters the stage. What happened? What are we to do with the past? and so on. (It 
is interesting to notice that it is in this vacuum Mr Parkis operates and serves as a 
messenger to the unanswered.) The pattern of peace → war → peace could therefore be 
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interpreted as an image, an elusive background for events, mirroring the different stages 
Bendrix and Sarah go through. 
 Furthermore, the peace-war pattern is highly significant in the sense that it adds 
further substance to the dichotomous arrangement of The End of the Affair. An attentive 
reader will even on first reading be struck by the text’s numerous instances of dwelling on 
opposing extremes, something which is a notable feature of Greene’s discourse. It is 
characteristic of the discourse that it moves back and forward, almost like the tide, flowing 
and ebbing, between love and hatred, belief and disbelief, life and death, peace and war. 
An even better metaphor is given by Sarah, as she contemplates human consciousness in 
one of her diary entries: ‘It’s strange how the human mind swings back and forth, from one 
extreme to another. Does truth lie at some point of the pendulum’s swing, at a point where 
it never rests, not in the dull perpendicular mean where it dangles in the end like a windless 
flag, but at an angle, nearer one extreme than another?’ (110) Besides offering a brilliant 
metaphor of dichotomy, Sarah’s contemplation displays an important preoccupation of the 
novel; namely the dialectics between movement and stasis. For structural purposes, I want 
to postpone a discussion of this proposition. As for now, let us pay some more attention to 
the area of space. 
 Although it has little to do with the political environment of the novel, there is 
another external space which, to a considerable degree, is intrinsically linked to the 
reflective quality discussed above. This is the space in which the pursuit(s) takes place, and 
inherent in the pursuit is the notion of the ‘following after,’ which somehow suggests 
spatial repetitiveness accompanied by a temporal delay. Mr Parkis, the most obvious 
example of this in the novel, pursues Sarah in actual space when he, for instance, follows 
her into the National Portrait Gallery and then into a church, or later, when Bendrix and Mr 
Parkis’s twelve-year-old boy become his accomplices upon their visiting the atheist Mr 
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Smythe. The fact of the matter is that, once we accept this external space as reflecting an 
internal, we realise that The End of the Affair operates with a multiple number of pursuers 
and pursued, of hunters and preys, again emphasising the dichotomy of the novel. Suffice 
it to mention only a few: Sarah pursues Mr Smythe’s ideology, Mr Smythe pursues 
Sarah’s, Sarah and Bendrix are pursued by their consciences and by God, Bendrix pursues 
Sarah’s route to belief, and so we could continue for quite a while.  
 Personally, for all its lack of a political narrative, I find the realisation of the 
reflective space intriguing as a powerful and illuminating tool which suggests and 
underscores the violence taking place within the characters of the story. Since the story is 
so explicitly subjective, I do not see that the absence of a political narrative should imply 
any inferior status to works where such a narrative is dialogised with the interior. Nor do I 
agree with Pendleton’s disclaiming the novel’s premise as a realistic novel. As we shall see 
in the following chapters, Bendrix is ‘spiritually dead’, and the only wish he is left with is 
a wish for complete annihilation. His full attention is devoted to the existential fight with 
God. Would such a man, we must ask ourselves, even bother to glimpse at the socio-
political environment in order to engage himself with a political narrative? Personally, I do 
not think so. Pendleton, it seems to me, is too caught up in what he himself thinks Greene 
should have done with the novel instead of deeming its narrator as believable or not, and 
that is neither here nor there. The narrator comes across as realistic, hence his ‘monological 
insistence’ is not a qualification which disclaims the novel’s premise as realistic. This said, 
let us now look at the subjective perceptions of time in the novel. 
 
Experiential Temporality 
 
 
The elusive questions surrounding the complex area of time have preoccupied Western 
philosophy throughout its entire history, and although they have mainly been the 
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prerogatives of philosophers and the cultural élite, the turn of the nineteenth century, 
accompanied by unprecedented scientific changes and innovations, carried in its wake a 
widened accessibility to such questions and a broader acceptance of individual 
perspectives on time. Time became, in the Einsteinian fashion, relative. ‘The clocks don’t 
agree. The inner one rushes along in a devilish or demonic – in any case, inhuman – way 
while the outer one goes, falteringly, its accustomed pace,’ reads a diary entry of the great 
modernist, Franz Kafka (quoted in Kern 1983: 17). Time is ultimately being experienced, 
and it is not necessarily given that we experience it the same way. 
 The End of the Affair seems to display an astute sensitivity to the matter in hand in 
its juxtaposition of what I have called experiential temporalities. It is particularly Sarah’s 
and Bendrix’s temporal experiences that are set up against each other, mainly because of 
the fact that they are the only ones whom Greene has allotted enough narrative space in 
which to express themselves thoroughly. The perspectives of other characters are handed 
to us either through dialogue or through a reporter (Bendrix or Sarah). In both cases it is 
important to keep in mind that no narration is neutral, and thus, we should neither take 
them at their word nor totally disregard them. A sceptical attitude usually proves 
illuminating in the end. 
 Of the two, it is Bendrix who spends most time contemplating and understanding 
the workings of time, which, when thinking about it, is not strange since it is he who is 
narrating the story. At all costs Bendrix seems to want to avoid the present. ‘I never lose 
the consciousness of time,’ he claims, ‘to me the present is never here: it is always last year 
or next week’ (51). Sarah describes him as being ‘jealous of the past and the present and 
the future’ (91), and I think that these two aspects, his avoidance of the present and his 
jealousy of time, should alert us to the underlying reasons for the particular structure of the 
story. On the one hand, the jumping backwards and forwards across the chronological span 
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of the action (the fabula) may suggest a motivation on Bendrix’s part to control time. Time 
is seen as a rival in a battle of power, a rival who has stolen ‘five seconds or five minutes’ 
of his life and wakes him up in ‘a changed world’ (71). On the other hand, even though he 
occasionally lapses into the present tense (the present of Bendrix’s writing the story), he 
never stays there for a long time and, thus, substantiates the claim that he avoids the 
present. 
 There is somehow a Greenean touch to the fact that Bendrix strives to control time 
in his narrtive. In his first autobiography, A Sort of Life (1971), Greene considers the 
motive that has made him a novelist. It is ‘a desire to reduce a chaos of experience to some 
sort of order, and a hungry curiosity’ (Greene 1999: 9), and an extract from his travel 
account, Journey Without Maps (1936), could serve as an elaboration:  
But there are times of impatience, when one is less content to rest at the urban stage, when 
one is willing to suffer some discomfort for the chance of finding – there are a thousand 
names for it, King Solomon’s Mines, the ‘heart of darkness’ if one is romantically inclined, 
or more simply, as Herr Heuser puts it in his African novel, The Inner Journey, one’s place 
in time, based on a knowledge not only of one’s present but of the past from which one has 
emerged. (Greene 2002b: 19-20, italics mine) 
 
In my opinion, it is crucial that we recognise that Bendrix’s act of writing down his 
account purports to be an act of cumulating knowledge. It is his way of reducing the chaos 
to some sort of order, an order wherein he understands and can find and accept his place in 
time. ‘I tell myself…writing this account of her, trying to get her out of my system for 
ever, for I have always told myself that if she died, I could forget her’ (58). From the end 
of the book we know that Bendrix does not succeed with this quest, partly because of his 
rigid unwillingness to compromise with time. It is almost as if his story becomes a diatribe 
against time and, as we shall see later, in the final analysis against God. 
 The End of the Affair does not only portray the narrator’s complicated internal 
encounter with time as a concept, and how he quests to control it, it also depicts Bendrix as 
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a character who, in his waveringly self-declared intellectual superiority, has trouble with 
accepting, and even looks down upon, other characters’ conception of time.  
I pushed the book across to him. ‘Oh, it was written years ago. She wrote that kind of thing 
in a lot of her books like all children.’ 
‘Time’s a strange thing,’ Father Crompton said. 
Of course the child wouldn’t understand it was all done in the past.’ 
‘St Augustine asked where time came from. He said it came out of the future which didn’t 
exist yet, into the present that had no duration, and went into the past which had ceased to 
exist. I don’t know that we can understand time any better than a child.’  
‘I didn’t mean…’ […] 
Quite suddenly I lost my temper. I believe I was annoyed chiefly by his complacency, the 
sense that nothing intellectual could ever trouble him, the assumption of an intimate 
knowledge of somebody he had only known for a few hours or days, whom we had known 
for years.’ (179-180, italics mine) 
 
One is at once reminded of the old priest in Brighton Rock (1938) and his ‘Corruptio 
optimi est pessima’ (Greene 2002a: 246), Father Rank in The Heart of the Matter (1948) 
who emphatically confesses to Mrs Scobie, ‘don’t imagine you – or I – know a thing about 
God’s mercy’ (Greene 2001: 272); even the agnostic Doctor Colin, in A Burnt-Out Case, 
takes on the shape of a typical Greenean priest when replying the Superior of the 
leproserie, ‘You try too hard to make a pattern, father’ (Greene 1961a: 247). In The End of 
the Affair, as in much of Greene’s fiction, the priest becomes a kind of oracle, meditating 
the predicament of human consciousness and knowledge, and in so doing, draws our 
attention to the limitations of human comprehension. Bendrix cannot accept that there is a 
limit to his perception of time, even less that his perception is being compared to that of a 
child’s, and, consequently, in a moment of frustration and futility, he loses first his speech 
and then his temper. He trembles at the realisation of being at a loss, and it is worth 
noticing, I think, that Father Crompton’s statement that ‘Time is a strange thing’ 
reverberates Bendrix’s saying he is ‘lost in a strange region’ (50). The inter-illumination of 
the two statements underscores that Bendrix is lost in time, that is, the strange 
incomprehensible region of mind. 
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 Contrary to Bendrix’s attempt to escape the present, Sarah seems determined to 
occupy and relish it. Even her ‘territory,’ as Bendrix explains, ‘her haphazard living-room 
where nothing matched, nothing was period or planned, where everything seemed to 
belong to that very week because nothing was ever allowed to remain as a token of past 
taste or past sentiment’ (13), supplies evidence for such an assertion. Among the characters 
in the novel, Sarah strikes me as a quintessence of a modernist, that is, notably, in the most 
general sense of that term. ‘She had no doubts. The moment only mattered. Eternity is said 
not to be an extension of time but an absence of time, and sometimes it seemed to me that 
her abandonment touched that strange mathematical point of endlessness, a point with no 
width, occupying no space’ (51, italics mine). For Sarah, time seems to reach its apotheosis 
in the moment or the momentary, and Bendrix’s words strike a sense of something 
distinctly transcendental, of something inexplicable, being part of this apotheosis. Bendrix 
experiences ‘contradictions in time,’ as opposed to Sarah, who for some reason is barred 
from such an experience in her existing ‘on the mathematical point’ (51).  
 This is also apparent if we again consider the motive of writing. In her comparative 
study of Kierkegaard and Greene, Anne T. Salvatore points to a vital proposition when she 
claims that ‘like [Bendrix], [Sarah] uses writing to recreate the affair’ (Salvatore 1988: 40). 
To some length, I am willing to accept and agree with what Salvatore says. Obviously, 
nobody would deny that writing about a past to which one once belonged is a kind of 
recreation. However, what really troubles me is that Salvatore blurs, and even equates, 
what I see as the different motives of the two writing protagonists. In my opinion, she 
partly fails when she claims that by ‘recalling his own past affair with Sarah, Bendrix seeks 
to render it eternally present through his act of writing’ (Salvatore 1988: 38). Arguably, the 
comment would fit Sarah’s motivation much better than Bendrix’s. ‘I haven’t the nerve to 
put them down,’ Sarah records on the day following that fatal night in June 1944, ‘but I’d 
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like to, because now when I’m writing it’s already tomorrow and I’m afraid of getting to 
the end of yesterday. As long as I go on writing, yesterday is today and we are still 
together’ (92). It is Sarah who seeks to render the affair, the moment, eternally present, 
while Bendrix, besides the wish to control time, seeks understanding in order to get the 
affair out of his system, or to put it slightly different, ‘to discover if one can from what we 
have come, to recall at which point we went astray’ (Greene 2002b: 21). As we shall see 
later on, however, Bendrix’s motivation is more complex than this. 
 Sarah longs for and belongs to the moment, and it is therefore interesting to notice 
that it is she, and only she, who experiences an epiphany in The End of the Affair. One 
could certainly argue that Mr Smythe, substantiated by his conversion, must have had an 
epiphany, but that is neither explicit in the novel nor is it likely that his has been as 
momentary as Sarah’s. His conversion seems founded upon a temporally developed 
revelation. Now the concept of epiphany is a slippery and complex one, and though I will 
not go into any thorough analysis of it here, I find that Henri Bergson offers a reasonable 
way into it. In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903) he distinguishes between two ways 
of knowing. Knowledge, as furthest developed in scientific, analytical, and conceptualising 
thinking, where things are seen as solid and discontinuing, is different from ‘absolute 
knowledge,’ which ‘is achieved by experiencing something as it is from within. This 
absolute knowledge can only be given by intuition’ (Kern 1983: 25). Real truth or 
knowledge can, in other words, only be discovered through intuition, not analysis. ‘The 
transcendence which “intuition” provides in Bergson’s philosophy,’ says Levenson, ‘is 
furnished by the “image” in Hulme’s literary theory’ (Levenson 1984: 45). To this we 
could add Joyce’s epiphanies or Virginia Woolf’s ‘moments of being.’ The momentary is 
quintessentially modernist.  
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 The epiphany in The End of the Affair occurs when Bendrix returns to his room 
after the explosion: 
The door of my room was open and coming along the passage I could see Sarah; she had 
got off the bed and was crouched on the floor – from fear, I supposed. She looked absurdly 
young, like a naked child. I said, ‘That was a close one.’ 
She turned quickly and stared at me with fear. I hadn’t realized that my dressing-gown was 
torn and dusted all over with plaster; my hair was white with it, and there was blood on my 
mouth and cheeks. ‘Oh, God,’ she said, ‘you’re alive.’ (72, italics mine) 
 
The irony of Sarah’s outburst, the ambiguous meaning incorporated into the signifier 
‘God’, working simultaneously as an expletive and a vocative, hints strongly and brilliantly 
to the fact that an epiphany has taken place. With deliberate intent, I think, Greene has 
placed the tag (she said) after ‘God’ with the sole purpose of maximising the stress on 
‘God’, making the irony and, consequently, the epiphany, the more effective. From Sarah’s 
retrospective point of view, we learn a little of what had happened: ‘and then he came in at 
the door, and he was alive, and I thought now the agony of being without him starts, and I 
wished he was safely back dead again under the door’ (95). The contradiction in the 
moment is only for Bendrix and the reader to see; for Sarah the moment is a moment of 
revelation, however painful it may be. When Bendrix recalls how Sarah once had said that 
she had ‘never loved anybody or anything’ like him, he contemplates her statement: ‘We 
most of us hesitate to make so complete a statement – we remember and we foresee and we 
doubt. She had no doubts…What did time matter – all the past and the other men she may 
from time to time (there is that word again) have known, or all the future in which she 
might be making the same statement with the same sense of truth?’ (50-51, italics mine) 
Sarah sees no contradiction because she is totally committed to the moment. 
 In conclusion, we have seen how time and space operate on some general levels of 
The End of the Affair. Comparable to much modernist literature, the novel’s obsession with 
the temporal and the spatial suggests a structural and thematic importance unparalleled in 
Greene’s oeuvre. Anachrony, subjective memory, reflective space and an astute sensitivity 
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to what I have called experiential temporality have been part of this. Still, there is a third 
position in terms of time and space which looms powerfully in the background, a position 
which belongs to a character ‘occupying no space’ (51) and existing ‘outside time’ (145), a 
character who leaves in his wake a sustained sense of friction and pain. 
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Chapter 3: Memory and Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
In his opening to ‘Introduction to the Structural Analysis of the Narrative,’ Roland Barthes 
underlines the centrality of narrative in the lives of human beings: 
The narratives of the world are without number. In the first place the word ‘narrative’ 
covers an enormous variety of genres which are themselves divided up between different 
subjects, as if any material was suitable for the composition of the narrative: the narrative 
may incorporate articulate language, spoken or written; pictures, still or moving; gestures 
and the ordered arrangement of all the ingredients: it is present in myth, legend, fable, short 
story, epic, history, tragedy, comedy, pantomime, painting,…stained glass windows, 
cinema, comic strips, journalism, conversation. In addition, under this almost infinite 
number of forms, the narrative is present at all times, in all places, in all societies; the 
history of narrative begins with the history of mankind; there does not exist, and never has 
existed, a people without narratives. (quoted in Polkinghorne 1988: 14) 
 
If it is true that there never has existed a people without narratives, it is also certain that 
there has never existed a people without memory, for a people without memory would 
necessarily imply the impossibility of the existence of narrative. St Augustine’s definition 
of memory might serve as well as any: ‘The present of things past is memory’ (Olney 
1998: 7). In the light of the definition, then, it seems indisputably clear that narrative is 
dependently linked to memory. To paraphrase it, a human being cannot narrate his own 
present, only his past, and that is just another way of saying that he can only narrate his 
own memory. As we shall see, the intertwinement of memory and narrative is not 
unproblematic, though. In The End of the Affair, this problematic facet constitutes an 
almost unsolvable problem for the writing protagonist, and I shall address it in due course. 
First, however, it is tempting to afford a thorough exploration of the beginning of the 
novel, not only because it is highly interesting in itself, but also because it has bearing on 
problems connected with memory and narrative. Secondly, it is crucial to acknowledge that 
part of my problem will be to define the genre of the protagonist’s piece of writing and to 
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look at what motivates this writing. Consequently, time and space will be offered to an 
investigation of those two aspects, as also those relate to memory and narrative. 
 
Beginning and End 
 
 
One reason why we find beginnings and endings problematic, and yet so fascinating, may 
be found firmly rooted in the fact that we cannot remember our own ‘entrances’ into the 
world, nor are we capable of telling/narrating about our own ‘exits.’ In his essay 
‘Openings: Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Knut Hamsun’s Hunger,’5 
which focuses primarily on narrative openings in general and specifically on the two 
openings of the novels of two authors who are esteemed among the generators of early 
modernism, Jakob Lothe links this problematic aspect to ‘ideas of beginning in history’ 
(Lothe 2002: 77). Drawing on an example from the Second World War because ‘[t]imes of 
war typically accentuate human beings’ sense of beginnings as well as endings’ (Lothe 
2002: 98), he points to how these two temporal dimensions are intertwined, albeit in a 
curious fashion. Consider, for instance, the words of Winston S. Churchill, quoted in the 
same footnote: ‘Now is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, 
perhaps, the end of the beginning.’ Since beginnings relate to endings and endings to 
beginnings, according to Lothe, ‘the problem of stating precisely when and where a given 
narrative line commences is highlighted’ (Lothe 2002: 78). This, together with ideas of 
beginning in history, lead us to one of the most salient human preoccupations throughout 
history, namely: where and when did the historical narrative line commence? 
 Since the second half of the nineteenth century the various attempts to answer that 
question have mainly fallen into two dominant groups if seen from a Western point of view 
                                                 
5 For my following treatment of the beginning of The End of the Affair I am indebted to the approach Lothe 
has applied in his survey of the opening of Tess of the d’Urberville in that essay. 
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– I believe such a generalisation over the subtle dissimilarities that might exist between the 
numerous approaches is in order since it is my intention to put emphasis on the ‘act of 
looking back’ itself and not on diversity and disparities. Now, the first and oldest of these 
is the group which accentuates a transcendental or mythical dimension beyond human 
beings, of which Christianity and the Biblical story of creation provide the most ready and 
natural example. The Book of Genesis is very properly regarded as the book of beginnings. 
As one exegete comments: The opening declaration of the Bible, ‘In the beginning God 
created the heaven and the earth’ (The Bible 1997: 1), ‘is that God is ultimate and prior to 
the universe, and that nature and man owe their being and continuance to Him. The 
“creation account” tells us as much about God as about His creation: He is a personal, 
sovereign, rational, moral being. The grand fact to which the entire Genesis narrative 
swiftly points is that the eternal God is also the God of creation, of conscience, of 
judgement, of human redemption and restoration’ (Henry 1960: 54). The second group, on 
the other hand, adheres to a scientific approach in order to grasp that great commencement, 
tracing human beings through an infinite number of random evolutionary processes back to 
the amoeba, and, finally, based on theories on the expanding universe, among other 
indicators, they explain its origin in the Big-Bang theory. For clarity’s sake, I do not imply 
that the one approach necessarily excludes the other and vice versa. Many do, indeed, find 
the two approaches, to a certain extent, reconcilable, and the scientific explanation is 
viewed considerably less threatening to adherents of a transcendental one today than it was 
at the time of being launched. Be that as it may, since it is my critical focus to discuss the 
problem of beginnings and endings, I shall before leaving this example point to what I 
believe is the most vital similarity between the two explanations. 
 Both the scientific and the transcendental approach correspond in their defining a 
specific moment in history when time and space, as we conceive of those dimensions, 
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came into existence. Conversely, tracing the historical line backwards, this moment 
denotes a point of temporal and spatial elimination, and as such, manifests itself as a 
‘curtain of ignorance,’ figuratively speaking. The great human paradox, however, is that 
we cannot live blissfully ignorant of what is beyond that curtain. It is in human nature, in 
human cognition, the necessity to think and reason in terms of cause and effect, or phrased 
differently, to see and understand how different events relate to one another. This necessity 
in what we could describe as the historical narrative has a corresponding element in literary 
and personal (biography) narratives, namely the plot. Hayden White recognises plot to 
‘mean a structure of relationships by which the events contained in the account are 
endowed with a meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole’ (White 1990: 
9). The American psychologist Donald E. Polkinghorne considers plot in much the same 
way, claiming plot’s function as an ordering of events into a ‘schematic whole’ by 
emphasising certain events’ contribution to ‘the development and outcome of the story.’ It 
becomes even more interesting as he continues that ‘[w]ithout the recognition of 
significance given by the plot, each event would appear as discontinuous and separate, and 
its meaning would be limited to its categorical identification or its spatiotemporal location’ 
(Polkinghorne 1988: 18-19, italics mine). There is a sense, then, in which the discontinuity 
of the moment mentioned above, the transition – note even how language, (‘transition’), 
must capitulate since it is temporally and spatially loaded when approaching the ‘curtain’ 
from behind – from the inexplicable to the explicable, signifying a loss of plot according to 
White and Polkinghorne, is the crux of why we are simultaneously troubled by and 
fascinated with beginnings and endings. I have included endings since there is a reverse, 
though analogous, transition in that term from the explicable to the inexplicable. To sum 
up, as far as personal biography is concerned, a human being can neither remember his 
own birth nor his death; as for the historical narrative, the collective human consciousness 
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can not remember or comprehend beyond the specific moment of the universe’s beginning, 
nor can it comprehend its ending, be that either a Christian apocalypse as described in the 
Book of Revelation or a scientific one manifesting itself as an inverse Big-Bang. As for 
now, my critical objective is to explore how openings and endings of literary narratives are 
comparably difficult, and as I do so my emphasis will be on how this problematical aspect 
is presented in the opening of The End of the Affair. In my next chapter I shall touch on 
some of the important aspects of the end of the novel. 
 Beginnings in literary texts have gained a momentous position in interpretation in 
the wake of the modernist period. I can only concur with Lothe that ‘our interpretation of a 
given narrative beginning may reveal how we interpret the text as a whole. The linkage 
between problems prompted by a text’s beginning and questions actualised in the literary 
discourse as a whole suggests that narrative beginnings are crucial both for the formation 
of narrative and for the thematics which this narrative serves to engender, shape and 
represent’ (Lothe 2002: 78-79). James Joyce and T.S. Eliot were among the modernists 
who realised and actualised the potentially inherent problem of narrative beginnings in 
their literary production. Joyce’s relatively late Finnegans Wake (1939) was 
idiosyncratically innovative in its exploitation of an elliptical beginning and an elliptical 
end which combine in order to give the impression of reading circularly,6 that is to say, to 
borrow the words of the persona in Eliot’s ‘East Coker’, ‘In my beginning is my end’ and 
‘In my end is my beginning’ (Eliot 1974: 196, 204). Thus an end presupposes somehow a 
beginning as does a beginning an end, and this should, unsurprisingly, lead us to the title of 
the novel under investigation here, for what is a novel’s title but its very beginning. This 
may seem an obvious point to make, but since the title can elusively epitomise the problem 
                                                 
6 The beginning runs ‘riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a 
commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs,’ whereas the end: ‘A way a lone a last 
a loved a long the’ (Joyce 1939: 3, 628). 
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prompted by the text, it is useful to remind ourselves that we have already begun when we 
start reading the first paragraph (Lothe 2002: 79). 
 Theodore W. Adorno perceives the title as a ‘microcosm of the work’ (Adorno 
1992: 4), and as such, I believe he lends a fair description to The End of the Affair. 
Personally, I find that this title together with the novel’s opening paragraph comprise one 
of the finest fictional openings I have ever come across in my modest encounter with 
literature. Stripped down to its most extreme, the title consists of basically two words: 
‘End’ and ‘Affair.’ Before I go on to analyse these, I believe it is in place to make some 
preliminary remarks about such an analysis. Undoubtedly, there is a difference between a 
first reading and a rereading of a novel, or for that sake, of any piece of fictional work, 
which has bearing on what we read into its title, arguably, also into its beginning. One is 
obviously more inclined to incorporate more into the title on a second reading than on a 
first, but I am also confident that, even as one goes along on a first reading, one constantly 
defines and redefines the title in relation to the discourse, be that consciously or not. Since 
it would be futile to account for the discrepancy between, for instance, a first and second 
reading of a novel – that would simultaneously imply answering the impossibility of where 
and when a first and second reading begin and end – I can only say that I posit my analysis 
below on a number of readings and close readings. 
 The first and most striking aspect of ‘end’ and ‘affair’ is that they both are 
intrinsically linked with temporality. The title makes us expect, and prepares us for, a 
sustained focus on an end of something, or on this something ending. Implicit in the title is 
also a sense of, even a presupposition about, a beginning of this affair, even though the 
emphasis is on its end. Particularly interesting, I believe, are the potentially ambiguous 
meanings of the word ‘affair,’ as they invite taking different approaches to the text. For my 
part, I shall reduce them to basically three: relationship, concern/subject, and 
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incident/episode. As we start to read we are not surprised to find that the story concerns a 
love affair between two of the main characters, and I am tempted to use Bendrix’s words 
as he tries to convince Henry to let him visit the detective bureau pretending to be a jealous 
lover: we, that is the jealous lovers, are ‘supported by the weight of literature’ (17). It is 
almost taken for granted, in other words, that a literary narrative concerns how a fictional 
character relates to other characters and the narrative’s given context. That Bendrix’s and 
Sarah’s relationship is epitomised by ‘affair’, then, is not unexpected, but there is a second 
relationship, albeit operating on a different level, which, in my opinion, is at least as 
important – that is the relationship between Bendrix and God. Since it is my critical 
intention to discuss this relationship in my chapter on memory and temporality, I will not 
elaborate on it here; suffice it to say this relationship connects more strongly to the other 
two meanings of ‘affair.’ 
 The second meaning, which I have labelled concern/subject and ought to be 
understood in the sense ‘this is my concern,’ tells us that ‘affair’ has a very personal ring to 
it. There is a sense in which ‘affair’ points to a specific personal and subtle space or 
dimension which I perceive as being that of memory. I have already pointed out in my 
previous chapter that Bendrix memorises specific events that happened between 1939 and 
1946 at the same time as he is putting them down on paper in 1949, something which 
timely clears the path for the third meaning and displays the interconnection existing 
between the second and the third. Now, it does not demand much imagination from us to 
extend an understanding of ‘affair’ as incident/episode to a conception of the term as 
narrative. Curious as it is, the grand fact to which ‘affair’ thus points is a specific account, 
and that the mutually reflexive acts of memory and narrative, which consequently gain 
contextual, structural and thematic significance, have bearing on the interpretation of this 
account. I intend, for structural purposes, to leave memory and narrative for a while, as I 
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believe it appropriate first to continue my reading of the beginning of The End of the 
Affair.  
 There are two textual elements between the title and the text, however, which need 
to be explored briefly before I fully give my attention to the opening paragraph: a 
dedication and an epigraph from Leon Bloy. As we shall see, there is particularly one 
problematic facet attached to both of these elements, and that is the need to establish whose 
voice we hear, that is to say, who is responsible for them? This, I suggest, brings us into 
the highly attractive, yet complex, area of reader-response theory, as we embark on terms 
like ‘historical author/reader,’ ‘implied author/reader’ and ‘narrator/narratee’. Wolfgang 
Iser was the first to put forward the concept of the ‘implied reader’ and, thus, succinctly 
put his finger on indeterminacy in modern narratives. As David Lodge paraphrases it: 
‘there is an inevitable degree of indeterminacy in all literary texts, due to the fact that the 
statements they make are not subject to ordinary criteria of verification and falsification, 
but there are also certain limits on the freedom of interpretation imposed by the formal 
properties of the text’ (Lodge 1990: 146). As far as the dedication in The End of the Affair, 
‘To C.’, is concerned, I find there is a blend of the voices of the historical and implied 
author and the narrator. Void of controversy is the fact that the historical author, Graham 
Greene, dedicated the novel to a historical person either beginning with the letter C or 
encoded as ‘C.’ Most likely, it was meant for Catherine Walston, Greene’s lover and a 
significant influence for over a decade of his life following the Second World War. 
Norman Sherry, whom Greene selected to write his biography, and who is still writing on 
the last of the three enormous volumes comprising Greene’s life, claims even, in his 
second volume7, that without Catherine ‘The End of the Affair would not have been 
started’ (219). Be that as it may, a much more controversial claim would be my own, that it 
                                                 
7 Sherry claims also that the character of Sarah is to an extensive degree based upon Catherine Walston. For 
further references, see vol. II, pp.219, 259-261, 280, 336. 
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is possible to understand, alongside the explanation above, the narrator as the voice behind, 
and thus the originator of, the dedication, which could be seen as addressed to Christ. I am 
apprehensively aware of possibly crossing the ‘limits on the freedom of interpretation’ 
now, but let me first give an outline of factors I consider in support of such a reading. First, 
it is a curious fact that a novel, in one way, positions itself somewhere in between a real 
historical world and a fictional one, that is to say that on certain points – again, we see that 
this fascinatingly enough relates to beginnings and ends in the sense ‘where do the real and 
fictional world begin and end?’ – a novel is an intersection of the real and the fictional. 
Consider, for instance, the title of The End of the Affair, which in my edition, besides 
appearing on the cover of the book, appears again inside followed by a page with historical 
data, concerning publishing dates and copyrights. Even though the title is set apart from the 
fictional text by a page of historical concerns, then, it does not signal that the title belongs 
exclusively to the historical world and not to the fictional, but, rather, it displays the title’s 
belonging to both. And so I believe it is with a dedication as well, obviously, only as long 
as one can supply further evidence for it. As I mentioned in my previous chapter, and as I 
will investigate to further length below, Maurice Bendrix, the narrator and protagonist of 
the story, does not only tell us this story, he also writes it. Thus, being a novelist, ‘author of 
The Ambitious Host, The Crowned Image [and] The Grave on the Water-Front’ (182), 
combined with the fact that he is paying so much attention to the word ‘end’ throughout 
the discourse, make it probable that it is Bendrix who calls this story ‘The End of the 
Affair’. If it is likely, then, that Bendrix is responsible for the title, it is also likely that he 
could have dedicated the book to somebody, and since what he writes is, as I shall argue, a 
kind of confession, it opens up the possibility of this account being addressed, albeit in an 
indirect fashion, to Christ – hence, the dedication.  
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 The second textual element, the epigraph taken from Leon Bloy, runs: ‘Man has 
places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they 
may have existence’. There are basically two brief points I would like to make here. 
Reading the epigraph, on the one hand, makes the reader expect that the discourse will 
concern a transition, taking place in psychic space, from something not existing to a 
particular existence of it. On the other hand, the word ‘suffering’ sets the tone for what is 
to come, signalling that the story will border on the tragic mode of existence rather than on 
something else. Additionally, ‘suffering’ is recognised as the presupposition for this 
transition. Interestingly, then, the epigraph succinctly delimits importance to the psychic 
space, while it simultaneously, through its reliance upon a chain of cause and effect, 
delineates what kind of plot we can expect as readers. As we now continue to explore the 
two opening paragraphs, we do wisely to bear the title, the dedication and the epigraph in 
mind. 
 Bendrix starts his account thus: 
A story has no beginning or end: arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience from 
which to look back or from which to look ahead. I say ‘one chooses’ with the inaccurate 
pride of a professional writer who – when he has been seriously noted at all – has been 
praised for his technical ability, but do I in fact of my own will choose that black wet 
January night on the Common, in 1946, the sight of Henry Miles slanting across the wide 
river of rain, or did these images choose me? It is convenient, it is correct according to the 
rules of my craft to begin just there, but if I had believed then in a God, I could also have 
believed in a hand, plucking at my elbow, a suggestion, ‘Speak to him: he hasn’t seen you 
yet.’ 
 For why should I have spoken to him? If hate is not too large a term to use in 
relation to any human being, I hated Henry – I hated his wife Sarah too. And he, I suppose, 
came soon after the events of that evening to hate me: as he surely at times must have hated 
his wife and that other, in whom in those days we were lucky enough not to believe. So this 
is a record of hate far more than of love, and if I come to say anything in favour of Henry 
and Sarah I can be trusted: I am writing against the bias because it is my professional pride 
to prefer the near-truth, even to the expression of my near-hate. (7, original emphasis) 
 
There is so much compressed information incorporated into this extract that it is 
exceedingly difficult to find a point of departure. Obvious points are pronounced, however, 
such as placing the narrative in a historical time and space and a ‘listing’ of characters we 
expect to play crucial roles within the story as the discourse proceeds. I have already 
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touched on several points connected with the setting in my previous chapter, so I see no 
need to repeat myself, but I believe some brief comments regarding the characters are in 
order. The opening signals quite clearly to its readers that the story is weaved around a 
triangular love drama, comprising the married couple Sarah and Henry Miles and the 
professional writer and narrator, whom we later learn is Bendrix. Even though we do not 
know exactly how this is going to unfold, we surmise that the plot somehow relates to the 
triangular drama and the cumulative problems generated by it.  
 The most fascinating characteristic of the beginning, in my opinion, is the narrator 
and how he draws attention to the heart of the matter when he thus starts by problematizing 
a story’s beginning and end. Let us first consider what kind of narrator we meet in this 
passage, and as we do so I shall make use of some fruitful terms from narrative theory. 
Maurice Bendrix is a first-person narrator who, in addition to being a narrator, is active in 
the plot, ‘i.e. in the dynamic shaping of the text’s action, events and characters’ (Lothe 
2000: 21). The narrative distance, manifesting itself as both temporal and spatial, should 
rewardingly not be ignored, as Bendrix is writing his account in 1949. The continual 
fluctuations between what I defined as the two presents in the previous chapter could 
pragmatically be viewed as the dialectics between two different narrative levels. Now, 
narrative theory distinguishes between three different narrative levels which are 
structurally hierarchical, where the highest level is the extradiegetic, the intermediate the 
diegetic and the lowest the hypodiegetic. As for now, I will only be concerned with the 
highest and the intermediate levels since those two correspond roughly with my two 
presents – there is a need now to modify the one present, which I claimed started from 
Bendrix’s meeting with Henry in 1946, to also incorporate what happened from 1939 and 
up to that meeting. The diegetic level, which relates to ‘the dominant level of action’ in 
The End of the Affair, merges then with the just-modified present, whereas the 
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extradiegetic, the level ‘right ‘above’ the action’ (Lothe 2000: 32), fuses with the present 
of Bendrix’s writing the account.  
It is striking that when Bendrix dispositions himself on the extradiegetic level, as 
he, for instance, does in the extract above, he very much resembles an authoritative third-
person narrator who comments ‘above’ his story through a so-called meta-narrative. It 
should not come as a surprise, therefore, that so many critical commentators on the novel 
have concluded that The End of the Affair is a kind of metafictional novel.8 Gray defines 
the term as ‘[f]iction about fiction, in particular novels which examine the nature of novel-
writing’ (Gray 1992: 173). Ronald G. Walker, for instance, notes that the novel ‘is 
fundamentally concerned with the making of fictions’ (Walker 1984: 222), and Robert 
Murray Davis consistently claims that we, that is the readers, ‘witness [Bendrix] writing 
the novel’ (Davis 1985: 402). However that may be, I find it slightly misleading. Even 
though it is true that the novel Greene has written is about Bendrix the novelist, Bendrix is 
not writing a novel – as I shall argue below, what Bendrix is writing is more in the genre of 
autobiography – hence it is not a novel about a novelist writing a novel, and, according to 
the definition, not directly a metafictional novel. Of course, there may be, and I do believe 
there are, implicit elements of metafiction within this fiction about autobiography, or, 
ultimately, this fiction about memory and narrative, but those are only of secondary 
importance. The primary importance lies in the fact that the text – through, and because of, 
the extradiegetic passages – draws attention to the complexities of the simultaneous acts of 
memorising and narrating/writing ‘one’s own story’. It is thus a crucial acknowledgement 
that my overall approach to The End of the Affair is precisely based upon those 
extradiegetic levels as they are presented throughout the discourse. I shall leave this for a 
                                                 
8 Novels about novelists are common in twentieth-century fiction. Suffice it to mention Doris Lessing’s The 
Golden Notebook (1962) and John Fowles’s  The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969). 
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while, as I go on investigating yet another fascinating characteristic of Bendrix as a 
narrator. 
There is a sense, discernible in the opening paragraphs, in which Bendrix wants to 
come across as a reliable and almost objective narrator of this ‘record of hate’ when he 
tells us that he ‘is writing against the bias because it is [his] professional pride to prefer the 
near-truth, even to the expression of [his] near-hate.’ And it is certainly true that he 
generally speaks favourably about the two people he claims to hate, Sarah and Henry. But 
it is also true that he paints a picture of himself, which I am tempted to claim is less 
favourable than what it actually is. Bendrix does not hesitate to tell us about his darker 
human sides, his hatred and jealousy, or how his love for Sarah was not particularly novel, 
but possessive, destructive and egotistically motivated. At one instance, when confronted 
by Henry’s assumption that Bendrix must have been Sarah’s lover, we get, if not an evil 
impression of Bendrix, at least a shockingly cruel one: ‘you were her pimp,’ Bendrix tells 
him, ‘You pimped for me and you pimped for them, and now you are pimping for the latest 
one. The eternal pimp’ (67). Bendrix is thus so one-dimensionally focused on his ‘heart of 
darkness’, to borrow Conrad’s wording, that he does not tell us about such attributes as 
Sarah ascribes him in her diary; for instance, his courage and responsibility: ‘I thought of a 
new scar on his shoulder that wouldn’t have been there if once he hadn’t tried to protect 
another man’s body from a falling wall. He didn’t tell me why he was in hospital those 
three days: Henry told me. That scar was part of his character as much as his jealousy’ 
(110, italics mine). In one sense, then, Bendrix seems to be extremely honest – we could 
even label him too reliable – as a narrator, something which at first sight seems to run 
contrary to what I said in the second chapter about Bendrix trying not to give himself too 
much away. However, I find the two arguments perfectly compatible since they relate to 
different aspects of his story and narration. While his honesty relates to the particular genre 
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of what Bendrix is writing and his motivation for doing so, his sustained attempt not to 
give himself away pertains to the fact that he is a novelist. Thus I believe Greene has 
created a very complex and, in this respect, almost a paradoxical narrator for his novel, 
who suitably embraces the numerous paradoxes portrayed within the text.   
Another peculiar feature of the opening paragraphs, which also relates to Bendrix 
as a paradoxical narrator, is the repeated emphasis on powerful human emotions like hate 
and love. In the second paragraph only, hate is mentioned seven times and love once. 
David Lodge has even bothered to give a rough statistical record of the occurrences of 
‘love’ and ‘hate’ in the entire novel, claiming ‘these words or forms of them recur about 
three hundred and one hundred times respectively.’ I can only concur with him that the 
‘effect is not monotonous because Greene is continually exploring new dimensions and 
interrelationships of love, hate, and the mixture of love and hate that is jealousy’ (Lodge 
1966: 34). Be that as it may, what we as readers need to ask ourselves is: how is it possible, 
or is it even possible at all, to simultaneously be so emotionally engaged in the story and 
‘writing against the bias?’ This, I suggest, could rewardingly be considered in the light of 
what narrative theory has termed attitudinal distance of the narrator. Lothe understands 
‘attitude’ as ‘the narrator’s level of insight, judgements, and values.’ Furthermore, 
‘[attitudinal distance] may also be a helpful term in discussions of the narrator’s position 
and function in relation to the intention and value system of the text’ (Lothe 2000: 36), of 
which necessarily the implied author is responsible. The intriguing point, however, is that 
when we encounter an unreliable, or as in our case, a too reliable, narrator, a discrepancy 
may arise between the narrator’s and the implied author’s value systems, consequently 
making interpretation the more difficult. One example of this effect, which has received a 
lot of critical attention over the years, is the characterisation of Sarah. Bendrix does indeed 
describe her in favourable terms, culminating in ‘all I know is that in spite of her mistakes 
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and her unreliability, she was better than most’ (131), but being entangled in emotions of 
love, hate and jealousy, we really wonder if Bendrix sees her for what she was. Ian Gregor, 
for one, recognises an undertone in Sarah ‘which reveals a curious amoral indifference’ 
(Gregor 1973:115), and a sense that she is a human being ‘without conscience’ (Gregor 
1973: 116), and personally I have to say I agree more with Gregor than I do with Evelyn 
Waugh, who, quoted at the back of my edition, claims that ‘the heroine is consistently 
lovable.’ Anyway, as we shall see below, this discrepancy between the two value systems 
will form part of the problem when I shall try to define what Bendrix is actually writing, 
but first let us finish the discussion about the opening paragraphs. 
What Bendrix does when he starts his account, stating that ‘[a] story has no 
beginning or end’, is partly to draw our attention to the arbitrariness of a story’s beginning. 
It is indeed concurrent with Lothe’s comment that ‘although all narratives must necessarily 
begin somewhere, and at a given point in time, there is a sense in which any beginning is 
coincidental, chosen rather than real’ (Lothe 2002: 78). Obviously, Bendrix could have 
chosen several other points of departure for his account such as his striking up an 
acquaintance with the Mileses in 1939, or for that sake, he could even have gone as far 
back as to Sarah’s writing in her childhood books several years before their chance 
meeting – another beginning would not necessarily imply a poorer plot as regards mystery 
and suspense. This said, it is important to recognise Bendrix’s emphasis on the 
arbitrariness of the ‘moment of experience from which to look back or from which to look 
ahead’ as a significant facet of the workings of memory (italics mine). I want to explain 
this by drawing on something I repeatedly experience in my everyday life. When I tell 
somebody about a past experience or past incident – that is, of course, a memory – I not 
only find that I begin my account differently than on other occasions when I have told the 
same story, but I also find that when I have started, I sometimes need to go back beyond 
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that starting point in order to clarify something which has bearing on what is to come. 
There is naturally a linkage here between this and the need, mentioned earlier, to 
understand a story in terms of cause and effect, and consequently a narrative’s beginning 
parallels the historical and biographical beginnings I pointed to earlier on in this chapter. 
But the intriguing and significant point is that when we, through our selves, remember and 
recite a memory, it is more probable that our beginnings are arbitrary rather than 
consciously chosen. Anyhow, in the opening passage of The End of the Affair there is yet 
another dimension accentuated in connection with its ‘arbitrary’ opening, which I now 
shall move on to explore. 
God is introduced as a transcendental but apprehensively intervening force in 
human lives, a personal force who can intrude upon both memory and narrative. Even 
though Bendrix’s beginning is ‘correct according to the rules of [his] craft’, even if his 
beginning is arbitrary someway or another, there is still a nagging doubt on Bendrix’s 
behalf that this specific beginning is not chosen or willed, at least not from his side. ‘[D]id 
these images choose me?’ ponders Bendrix as he wonders if it is not as plausible to believe 
in a God, ‘a hand, plucking at [his] elbow’ with the suggestion and direction: begin here! 
Thus Bendrix – and ultimately Greene through his narrator – effectively set up an 
existential opposition between human free will and divine predetermination. The brilliance 
of both the implied author and the narrator, however, is that they make this opposition 
work on two different, though elusively intersecting, levels, culminating in the words; 
‘“Speak to him: he hasn’t seen you yet.”’ First, on the narrative level, that is to say, 
Bendrix’s story as a written narrative, Bendrix opens up the possibility that it is God who 
wills the narrative to begin precisely with his meeting with Henry in 1946. Secondly, on 
the level of memory, there is a retrospective doubt, manifesting itself exactly through 
memory, that he did not by his own will choose to speak to Henry, but that also this was 
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willed and predetermined by God. There is a sense, then, in which both the story and the 
process of narrating the story have significant existential importance, and if Franz Stanzel 
is correct in asserting that ‘for an embodied narrator,’ that is a first-person narrator, the 
motivation for narrating ‘is existential; it is directly connected with his practical 
experiences, with the joys and sorrows he has experienced, with his moods and needs’ 
(Stanzel 1986: 93), this aspect is much enforced in The End of the Affair. 
If we accept that there is such an existential opposition at work in the novel, there is 
an entailed facet which demands explicit attention when reading. A word like ‘arbitrary’, 
which first appears in the opening passage and thus suggests interpretive significance, and 
words in the similar fashion, like ‘accidental’ and ‘coincidental’, turn up continuously in 
the discourse, accentuating exactly this existential opposition. These words, as they crop 
up, need to be given special attention. Here we could mention Bendrix’s accident which 
nearly kills him and many other examples, but instead of listing them, let us consider one 
incident towards the end of the book which dwells on the word ‘coincidence.’ After a 
meeting with Sarah’s mother Henry is troubled about not giving Sarah a proper funeral: 
‘It’s an extraordinary coincidence, isn’t it? Baptized at two years old, and then beginning to 
go back to what you can’t even rember…It’s like an infection.’ 
‘It’s what you say, an odd coincidence.’…‘I’ve known stranger coincidences,’ I went on. 
During the last year, Henry, I’ve been so bored I’ve even collected car numbers. That 
teaches you about coincidences. Ten thousand possible numbers and God knows how many 
combinations, and yet over and over again I’ve seen two cars with the same figures side by 
side in a traffic block.’ 
‘Yes. I suppose it works that way.’ 
‘I’ll never lose my faith in coincidence, Henry.’ (187-188) 
Now, we cannot be impartial and uninvolved with plot in general, and specifically not with 
a conception of plot in our own lives – confront White’s and Polkinghorne’s definitions of 
plot above (p. 42) – and analogously we cannot stay remote and uncommitted to a word 
like ‘coincidence;’ we need to take a stance. Is a coincidence merely a coincidence, or are 
there forces behind or within a coincidence, explicable or not, and of existential 
importance, which form an ‘alternative to “coincidence”’ (189), to use Bendrix’s own 
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words? In this passage we meet a Bendrix who is so strongly attached to the word that he 
despairingly confesses faith in it. But we also know, from the opening passage, that 
Bendrix has renounced this faith and replaced it with a faith in the alternative, which is 
God. (‘that other, in whom in those days we were lucky enough not to believe’). Thinking 
in terms of the epigraph, then, and its specific attention to a transition taking place, the 
beginning of The End of the Affair signals that the novel will be concerned with what led 
Bendrix from a position as a disbeliever to a position as a believer. 
 The main part of this chapter so far has attempted to expose some of the significant 
elements we encounter in the novel’s beginning. The interpretatively rich opening of The 
End of the Affair offers several other points on which I have not touched at all. Frank 
Kermode, for instance, recognises many other vital features which he finds germinal in the 
first page of the novel; he even puts his finger on sentences contained in the opening 
passage which are crucial to Greene’s entire oeuvre (Kermode 1987: 41-42). However, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to comment on all of those, as I have mainly delimited my 
focus to beginning in relation to memory and narrative. I am also aware of the fact that this 
relation has been present more through implication, rather than conscious argument so far, 
but I intend to let it be fully embraced by the argument towards the end of this chapter. 
First, however, I would like to take a fruitful detour by investigating Bendrix’s motivation 
for writing and addressing the specific nature of what he is writing. 
 
Motivation and Genre 
 
‘A detective must find it as important as a novelist,’ says Bendrix in one of the 
extradiegetic passages, ‘to amass his trivial material before picking out the right clue. But 
how difficult that picking out is – the release of the real subject’ (25). When I now proceed 
 56
to explore motivation and genre I am conscious of confronting exactly the same dilemma. 
Before we can infer anything at all, we need to amass from the text, in particular from the 
extradiegetic levels of narrative, the significant elements which, subsequently, must be 
pieced together in order to reach a broader understanding of those two complexes. What 
will comprise part of the problem is the fact that motivation and genre – including memory 
and narrative – are curiously and inevitably intertwined, and yet I need to discuss them 
separately. When possible, however, I shall try to comment on this linkage as I proceed, 
and finally, towards the end of this section, I shall bring the two together. As for now, let 
us start by looking at the nature of Bendrix’s piece of writing. 
 There is an intellectual excitement pertaining to the way the implied reader needs to 
interpret the discrepancy, mentioned above, between the text’s and the narrator’s value 
systems, particularly when investigating the matter in hand. In The End of the Affair, a 
repetitive feature of Bendrix’s extradiegetic passages is his attempts to define what he is 
writing. His definitions should neither be regarded as satisfactory – some of them stand 
even out as obvious contradictions – nor should they be dismissed due to a lack of certainty 
and credibility. The text’s value system, I believe, tells us that Bendrix is in search for his 
identity, and that this identity can only be found through an opaque act of writing. It is very 
much in line with Davis’s valid comment: ‘There is a further distinction between, on the 
one hand, “work” as the kind of mechanical method he once employed and a body of work, 
the novels he lists as the work of “Bendrix the scribbler” (p.228), and, on the other, work 
as struggle towards a discovery of the subject and of the self’ (Davis 1985: 403, italics 
mine). A perceptive remark, indeed, and, still, I am puzzled as to how Davis can unite this 
observation with his claim that Bendrix is ‘composing a novel’ (Davis 1985: 403); it just 
does not sound convincing. For let it be clear once and for all that Bendrix is not writing a 
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novel. Even Bendrix himself is confidently certain of that, reflecting ‘[i]f I were writing a 
novel I would end it here’ (147). 
 As I have mentioned a couple of times already, Bendrix’s piece of writing is more 
in the genre of autobiography. He is writing about real, not invented but self-experienced 
events which have been stored away in memory. Following the introductory quote to this 
section, Bendrix continues: 
Now that I come to write my own story the problem is still the same, but worse – there are 
so many more facts, now that I have not to invent them. How can I disinter the human 
character from the heavy scene – the daily newspaper, the daily meal, the traffic grinding 
towards Battersea, the gulls coming up from the Thames looking for bread, and the early 
summer of 1939 glinting on the park where the children sailed their boats – one of those 
bright condemned pre-war summers. (25) 
 
Not only does this passage tell us that Bendrix, in this moment of writing, is aware of 
telling his own story, it also describes the barriers Bendrix is confronted with when trying 
to move content stored in memory to content expressed in a written narrative. Again, I 
think, there is a stroke of brilliance in Greene’s discourse in the way he exploits the words 
‘heavy scene’, making a parallel between the pre-war summers and memory. If the pre-war 
summers were times of unrest, uncertainty and an almost mechanically repetitive way of 
life – note even how the rhythm and pace of the following discourse suggest a ‘ticking 
bomb’ where innocence (‘the children’) is on the verge of being lost, and human beings 
recede into the background because they can no longer control the powerful forces they 
have set in motion – memory’s transition into narrative is an uncertain, unstable and far 
from innocent act, where human characters are not easily disinterred. This goes straight 
into the heart of the problem of memory and narrative, and I shall return to it shortly. 
 First, however, it is interesting to recognise that Bendrix contradicts himself just 
about ten pages later when he redefines his writing. ‘There it goes again – the I, I, I, as 
though this were my story, and not the story of Sarah, Henry, and of course, that third, 
whom I hated without yet knowing him, or even believing in him’ (35-36). Bendrix’s 
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wavering as to what he is writing is ingrained in the two points I made above: on the one 
hand, the existential motivation for narrating; on the other, the existential opposition 
between human free will and divine predetermination. It is clear that the existential 
motivation leads Bendrix to believe he is writing his own story, expressing self-
experienced events and, not least, his own self, but how futile it would be to believe that 
this is his story if he is just a tool without free will within the hands of the Master Novelist. 
As I suggested in my second chapter, Bendrix’s writing can be considered a diatribe both 
against time and God. In other words, the ongoing battle between Bendrix and God, which 
manifests itself throughout the discourse, can be seen as the generator for this wavering. Be 
that as it may, since the relation between God and Bendrix will form a substantial part of 
the body of the next chapter, I shall leave it for now and consider another aspect which 
might lead us to concluding that Bendrix’s writing belongs to the genre of autobiography. 
 As appears from the following extract, Bendrix intends his writing to be read by 
unknown readers: 
How can I make a stranger see her as she stopped in the hall at the foot of the stairs and 
turned to us? I have never been able to describe even my fictitious characters except by 
their actions. It has always seemed to me that in a novel the reader should be allowed to 
imagine a character in any way he chooses: I do not want to supply him with ready-made 
illustrations. Now I am betrayed by my own technique, for I do not want any other woman 
substituted for Sarah, I want the reader to see the one broad forehead and bold mouth, the 
conformation of the skull, but all I can convey is an indeterminate figure. (18, italics mine) 
 
It is thus likely that Bendrix the scribbler aims at publishing this account as he has done 
with his three preceding novels; he wants a stranger to read this. The riveting essence of 
this passage, however, is the emphasis it puts on the insufficient nature of language when it 
comes to depicting a real, self-experienced world, and it forces me to continue the 
discussion I started in the penultimate paragraph about the transition from memory to 
narrative. If all Bendrix can convey is an ‘indeterminate figure,’ that means that there is no 
such thing as a one-to-one scale between memory/reality and narrative/language – there is 
always a discrepancy between the two which clears the entrance for doubt to wonder 
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‘whether anything that I am putting down here is true’ (50). Since language thus is both so 
elusive and inadequate, it is apparent that there is no transparency between the Saussurian 
signified and signifier. Furthermore, ‘at any given time,’ as claims Ferdinand De Saussure, 
‘[language] is an institution in the present and a product of the past’ (Saussure 2000: 3). I 
intend to ‘misuse’ the quote – hopefully for rewarding purposes – but let me first make it 
clear that Saussure speaks here of language as an established system in evolutionary terms. 
Now, what I believe the quote succinctly pinpoints is the problematic time lag that 
accompanies writing about something one has experienced. The temporal distance is not a 
negligible factor, as language exists only in the present of Bendrix’s writing, while at the 
same time it is generated from his past experiences. Bendrix’s inability to convey beyond 
an ‘indeterminate figure,’ then, is accordingly due to both the inadequacy of language and 
the temporal distance inherent in language itself. 
 In connection with my comments on the dedication of The End of the Affair, I 
claimed that Bendrix’s piece of writing could be considered some sort of confession. As 
Frank Kermode was the first to point out, God emerges from Bendrix’s account as not only 
a divine lover, but also divine novelist. ‘Bendrix’s book is plotted by God, a testimony to 
His structural powers’ (Kermode 1987: 41, italics mine). But this testimony is fortified 
once we understand Bendrix’s book as a kind of autobiographical account meant to be 
published. Towards the end of the novel Bendrix reflects on the potential consequences of 
the suspicious miracles that occurred in the wake of Sarah’s death: 
I felt like a swimmer who has over-passed his strength and knows the tide is stronger than 
himself, but if I drowned, I was going to hold Henry up till the last moment. Wasn’t it, after 
all, the duty of a friend, for if this thing were not disproved, if it got into the papers, nobody 
could tell where it would end? I remembered the roses at Manchester – that fraud had taken 
a long time to be recognized for what it was. People are so hysterical in these days. There 
might be relic-hunters, prayers, processions. Henry was not unknown; the scandal would be 
enormous. And all the journalists asking questions about their life together and digging out 
that queer story of the baptism near Deauville. The vulgarity of the pious Press. I could 
imagine the headlines, and the headlines would produce more ‘miracles’. We had to kill 
this thing at the start. (189-190) 
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If, as I believe, Bendrix intends to get the account published, there are two potential 
scenarios underlying this intention. First, just like the ‘sensational’ story attached to the 
memento Bendrix receives from Mr Parkis – ‘the Bolton Case’ – had ‘made a great stir’ 
(87), so could the rumours surrounding the miracles ascribed to Sarah have resulted in 
great commotion, leading Bendrix to renounce these while simultaneously verifying what 
had actually happened. But since there is no mention of such a commotion and subsequent 
need for denial and verification, this reading seems less than plausible. It is more likely, as 
the second scenario suggests, that, like Sarah, Bendrix has come to ‘believe the whole bag 
of tricks’ and has ‘fallen into belief’ like he once ‘fell in love’ (146-147). By writing and 
publishing the book Bendrix risks that it gets ‘into the papers,’ ‘relic-hunters, prayers, 
processions,’ even that the Catholic Church will make a saint out of Sarah, and the only 
acceptable reason for that is that he now believes in God and the miracles himself. Let it be 
said, however, that I do not believe Bendrix’s motivation for writing is a wish to secure a 
position for Sarah as a saint – Bendrix does not write her hagiography, that is – even 
though that might be an implication of it. It seems to me that his motivation is founded 
upon a much more complex ground than that. 
  Again, accepting that Bendrix proposes to publish ‘The End of the Affair’, enables 
us to interpret The End of the Affair as an unconventional, but nevertheless sincere, kind of 
confession. There is a meticulous linkage here to some of the aspects of Bendrix as a 
narrator, on which I commented above. In particular, I am thinking about the fact that 
Bendrix is very much focused on his darker human sides and that he tries to come across as 
reliable. It is thus curiously plausible to understand Bendrix, when he tells us of his 
intrusion into Sarah and Henry’s marriage, how his jealousy and hatred led him to hire Mr 
Parkis to detect Sarah’s new lover and how he prevented Sarah getting a proper funeral – 
the list of immoral actions is almost inexhaustible – as a man who indirectly confesses his 
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sins in a written form. In the light of this, Bendrix’s writing and publishing this account 
seems motivated by a desire for atonement. Of course, that is not to say that Bendrix is at 
peace with God – God is actually the only one with whom Bendrix is left to battle – nor do 
I suggest that this desire to atone is the only element that motivates him. As I aimed to 
show in the previous chapter, Bendrix tries to cumulate understanding of what happened 
by reflecting through memory and writing. Additionally, and more importantly, Bendrix is 
motivated by putting up an existential fight against God. His pen, out of which his 
‘bitterness leaks’ (12), becomes his only sharp weapon against God if there is the slightest 
possibility of him being wrong when he towards the end of his story suspects that  
we have to be pushed around. We have the obstinacy of non-existence. We are inextricably 
bound to the plot, and wearily God forces us, here and there, according to his intention, 
characters without poetry, without free will, whose only importance is that somewhere, at 
some time, we help to furnish the scene in which a living character moves and speaks, 
providing perhaps the saints with the opportunities for their free will. (186, original 
emphasis)  
 
That Bendrix is at the same time motivated by a desire for atonement and a desire 
to fight God may at first sight seem to run contrary to one another. There is an obvious 
analogy here to Bendrix’s relationship with Sarah, which is motivated by an apparent 
contradiction between love and hate. It is one of Greene’s typical paradoxes, I believe, 
accentuating that much truth can be found within such contradictions. For would it not, 
after all, have been untrustworthy – not to say utopian – if Bendrix’s relation to God was 
only one-dimensionally motivated? Intriguing as it is, the Biblical story of Jacob wrestling 
with the Lord jumps easily to mind. After having fought the whole night, the Lord says: 
‘Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me. 
And he said unto him, What is thy name? And he said, Jacob. And he said, Thy name shall 
be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with 
men, and hast prevailed’ (The Bible 1997: 40). To fight the Lord in order to obtain His 
blessing, then, is indeed paradoxical, but nevertheless not unbelievable, and the story, 
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succinctly points to the two-fold nature of Bendrix’s motivation: the wish to confess and 
atone and the need to battle with God. For as we now shall see, the battle with God is the 
only thing left in Bendrix; the rest has come to an end. 
First, there is a strong indication that Bendrix has come to an end of love. Needless 
to say, Bendrix lost the great love of his life, melodramatically speaking, when Sarah died 
of pneumonia in 1946, even though the first clear-cut step towards the end of their love 
accompanied Sarah’s decision to leave Bendrix in 1944. Bendrix is even confident ‘the end 
had started long before: the fewer telephone calls for this or that inadequate reason, the 
quarrels I began with her because I had realized the danger of love ending’ (145). 
Furthermore, there is a sense that when Sarah now is dead, Bendrix is robbed of sexual 
desire, that his ‘passion for Sarah had killed simple lust for ever. Never again would I be 
able to enjoy a woman without love’ (58). He has ‘given all the sex’ he has away (141), 
doubting whether he can fall in love again, and when he brings with him a prostitute when 
Henry is away on a conference, he finds himself impotent and saddened at ‘abandoning for 
ever something [he] had enjoyed so much’ (171).  
The second element, which, besides his love for Sarah, once comprised the great 
passion of his life, has also come to an end, namely his passion for writing: 
For I have come to an end of my interest in work now: no one can please me much with 
praise or hurt me with blame. When I began that novel with the civil servant I was still 
interested, but when Sarah left me, I recognized my work for what it was – as unimportant 
a drug as cigarettes to get one through the weeks and years. If we are extinguished by 
death, as I still try to believe, what point is there in leaving some books behind any more 
than bottles, clothes or cheap jewellery? and if Sarah is right, how unimportant all the 
importance of art is. (148) 
 
The reviewers may after all be correct in asserting that a ‘craftsman…was all that was left 
[him] of what had been a passion’ (35). Besides the fact that both his love and passion for 
art have come to an end, there is a general feeling throughout The End of the Affair that 
everything in the writing protagonist’s life is coming to an end. The purposeful life has 
somehow gone astray: ‘I turned back not knowing where to go. That is the worst of time 
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nowadays – there is so much of it’ (66). Losing a direction in life leads Bendrix to a loss of 
individuality (138), and it all becomes like dying ‘a little more every day’ (139). It is also 
possible, I believe, to interpret Bendrix as a character apprehensively longing for death, 
‘the shattering annihilation that would prevent for ever the getting up [and] the putting on 
of clothes’ (70). Even on the first page of his account he expresses artistically this longing 
as he ponders on the word comfort: ‘To me comfort is like the wrong memory at the wrong 
place or time’ (7). The absolute absence of logicality in this simile, implying some sort of 
non-existence, suggests that Bendrix believes it is only possible to be at ease and find 
comfort in death.  
Furthermore, we need to remind ourselves that after that fatal night in June 1944 
and the subsequent break-up of their relationship, Bendrix quite seriously considers 
suicide. ‘Then the date came and the play went on and on and I didn’t kill myself,’ and 
then follows his reason for not acting according to his intention; a reason which most 
intriguingly points straight to the core of my approach: ‘It wasn’t cowardice: it was a 
memory that stopped me – the memory of the look of disappointment on Sarah’s face when 
I came into the room after the V1 had fallen. Hadn’t she, at the heart, hoped for my death, 
so that her new affair with X would hurt her conscience less, for she had a kind of 
elementary conscience?’ (75, italics mine). As it was a memory that motivated him to go 
on living then, memory is the force which now compels Bendrix to let the ink leak out of 
his pen one final time, all leading up to ‘The End of the Affair,’ and just like the 
mysterious Mr X was part of that memory, so, as we shall see in the next chapter, is God to 
be found in memory when Bendrix is writing his story. Memory becomes thus a kind of 
existential motivator and the only driving force left in Bendrix’s life. It is therefore not 
unlikely that the completion of ‘The End of the Affair’ will be Bendrix’s last act. I do not 
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intend to pursue that possibility, however, and shall leave it hanging elliptically in the air 
as I now go on to elaborate on aspects of memory and narrative.  
 
Memory and Narrative 
 
I mentioned in my second chapter that Greene became a novelist because of ‘a desire to 
reduce a chaos of experience to some sort of order.’ In Ways of Escape (1980) he expresses 
a typically modernist view, claiming that ‘[w]riting is a form of therapy; sometimes I 
wonder how all those who do not write, compose or paint can manage to escape the 
madness, the melancholia, the panic fear which is inherent in the human situation’ (285). 
Commenting on this quote while drawing on Alan Wilde’s Horizons of Assent: 
Modernism, Postmodernism and the Ironic Imagination, Salvatore highlights that to ‘find 
refuge in the order and symmetry of art…is to create an apparently unresolvable, ironic 
contradiction between the unified formal properties of a novel and its philosophical 
standpoint’ (Salvatore 1988: 5). Samuel Beckett came to express some of the same 
concerns, although more on the general level of contemporary art. According to Tom 
Driver, in his account of a conversation with Beckett in Paris, the novelist and playwright  
began to speak about the tension in art between the mess and form. Until recently, art has 
withstood the pressure of chaotic things. It has held them at bay. It realized that to admit 
them was to jeopardize form. ‘How could the mess be admitted, because it appears to be 
the very opposite of form and therefore destructive of the very thing art holds itself to be?’ 
But now we can keep it out no longer, because we have come into a time when ‘it invades 
our experience at every moment. It is there and it must be allowed in …What I am saying 
does not mean that there will henceforth be no form in art. It only means that there will be 
new form, and that this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos and does not try 
to say that the chaos is really something else. The form and the chaos remain separate. The 
latter is not reduced to the former. That is why the form itself becomes a preoccupation, 
because it exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodates. To find a form 
that accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now.’ (quoted in Olney 1998: 11-
12) 
 
Needless to say, the typical form of the Greenian narrative – David Lodge labels Greene’s 
fiction as ‘neorealist post-modern fiction’ (Lodge 1990: 41) – is distinctively dissimilar to 
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the rather obscure and idiosyncratic form of the Beckettian one. Although The End of the 
Affair, as mentioned earlier, is relatively experimental when considering Greene’s 
production in isolation, it is still clear that its form does not, as Beckett makes a call for, 
‘accommodate the mess.’ However fascinating this discussion is, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to go further into it. As for my purposes, I find that the problem of form and 
content, order and chaos, and experience and art, which confronts the historical artist as a 
well-nigh impassable mountain, has crucial parallels to the position Bendrix struggles with 
as a narrator and writer of his own story.  
For although there is an ordered form in Bendrix’s narrative, there is also a sense 
that the mess he projects into the ordered narrative simultaneously lies as a disturbing and 
troubling shell around this order. In his profound study Memory and Narrative, which 
investigates the evolving literary form of autobiography from St. Augustine, through Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and up to Samuel Beckett, James Olney relates the mess to the human 
faculty of memory: ‘the primary agent in the making of the mess – and perhaps in its 
unmaking too – is nothing other than human memory…a faculty that for better and worse 
is much more than a faculty, too often out of our own (or any) control’ (Olney 1998: 16). 
This is very much in accordance with what I see as one of Bendrix’s major problems, 
namely memory itself. For if Bendrix’s conception of existence stands before him as 
chaotic, it is because memory – which is ‘the present of things past,’ according to St 
Augustine – is a simultaneous expression of, and the total accumulation of, every past 
incident in his life. What memory, if it is so positioned that it is ‘out of our control,’ 
chooses to highlight and bind together in order to delineate a ‘plot’ (see definition on p. 42) 
does not necessarily constitute the truth. Again, Bendrix himself even suspects that ‘[i]f 
this book of mine fails to take a straight course, it is because I am lost in a strange region: I 
have no map. I sometimes wonder whether anything I am putting down here is true’ (50). 
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But as we have seen, the problem becomes even more pressing when memory is 
subsequently transferred to a narrative form, where language itself does not provide more 
than an ‘indeterminate figure.’ The analogy between my interpretation of the Saussurian 
quote and St Augustine’s definition of memory is obvious: both are faculties of the present 
while they at the same time are products of the past. Neither memory nor narrative can 
fully and correctly provide Bendrix with a picture of what really happened – at best he can 
hope for something bordering on the truth – and the ultimate cause for this is most likely 
time itself. Thus, the main reason why Bendrix embarks on a quest to control time, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, might be found firmly rooted in the fact that it is the 
temporal dimension which blurs, and so reduces the utility of, memory and narrative. What 
is left of existence is only chaos. 
Greene, however, ingenuously plays on what I have called reflective space in order 
to enhance in the novel this sense of chaos. First, there is a sense, typically in line with the 
modernist feeling of alienation, in which Bendrix – and we might as well add Greene – 
conceive of existence as being more complicated and chaotic than it was for the previous 
generations. When Bendrix goes through Sarah’s childhood books, he picks up one which 
had been one of his own favourites, Scott’s Last Expedition. ‘It seemed curiously dated 
now, this heroism with only the ice for enemy, self-sacrifice that involved no deaths 
beyond one’s own. Two wars stood between us and them’ (173, italics mine). The same 
sense of being lost is conveyed when he looks at the photograph of Henry’s father: ‘I 
thought how like the photograph was to Henry…and how unlike. It wasn’t the moustache 
that made it different – it was the Victorian look of confidence, of being at home in the 
world and knowing the way around, and suddenly I felt again that friendly sense of 
companionship. I liked him better than I would have liked his father…We were fellow 
strangers’ (14, italics mine). Both passages are ripe with a sense of disillusion and 
 67
alienation, and there is a distinct feeling, I believe, particularly in the first passage, that the 
intrusion of the two wars is seen as the generator for this feeling of being lost in the world. 
Much of the action in The End of the Affair takes place during the Second World War, and 
specifically during the Blitz. Without making the connection too explicit, Greene manages 
in a subtle way to parallel the chaos of war with Bendrix’s conception of existence as 
chaotic. An illustrative example is when Mr Smythe tries to convince Bendrix of giving 
Sarah a Catholic funeral: 
[Smythe] was turning the screw of absurdity too far. I wished to shatter the deadness of this 
buried room with laughter. I sat down on the sofa and began to shake with it. I thought of 
Sarah dead upstairs and Henry asleep with a silly smile on his face, and the lover with the 
spots discussing the funeral with the lover who had employed Mr Parkis to sprinkle his 
door-bell with powder. The tears ran down my cheeks as I laughed. Once in the blitz I saw 
a man laughing outside his house where his wife and child were buried.’ (143) 
 
Chaos and absurdity pervade the war, they pervade existence, and finally, even though the 
result, to some extent, is an ordered narrative form, they pervade the mutual acts of 
remembering and narrating when Bendrix writes down his account in 1949. 
 In the course of this chapter we have seen how the various elements comprising the 
beginning of The End of the Affair draw our attention to memory and narrative as two 
powerful complexes. We have seen how its own narrative opening problematizes the need 
for such a starting point and how the problem of a narrative beginning is an extension of 
one of memory’s own characteristic problems; namely that memory is a simultaneous, 
present existence of things past. To make sense of memory one needs to somewhat 
arbitrarily pick an episode as a point of departure and then connect other episodes to that 
by binding them to the temporal dimension. In addition, by investigating complex concepts 
like genre and motivation I have shown how memory compels Bendrix not only to confess, 
atone and cumulate understanding, but also to pick up his pen as a sword against God in an 
existential fight for free will. For as we shall see in the following chapter, it is God who 
stands at the end of memory.  
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Chapter 4: Memory, Temporality and God 
 
 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been  
Point to one end, which is always present. 
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. My words echo 
Thus; in your mind. 
 But to what purpose 
Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves 
I do not know 
– T.S Eliot, ‘Burnt Norton’ –  
 
 
 
 
Bakhtinian Chronotope and Memory 
 
Over the last decades the theories of the Russian Mikhail Bakhtin, often referred to as 
dialogism, have received a great deal of scholarly attention. As a literary critic and theorist 
Bakhtin has been welcomed by many as a liberator from the tight conventions of the 
schools of Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction which had dominated 
literary theory since the 1960s. David Lodge, for one, suggests in his collection of essays, 
After Bakhtin, that the discovery and dissemination of Bakhtin’s writings have opened up 
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new possibilities for the discussion of literary texts. Among the numerous attractive terms 
in Bakthin’s thinking, I find his ideas of the chronotope in the novel particularly intriguing. 
 In his essay ‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel’ Bakhtin defines 
this term as 
the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed in literature…In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators 
are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes 
on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to 
the movements of time, plot and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators 
characterizes the artistic chronotope. (Bakhtin 1981: 84) 
 
Bakhtin recognises several different types of chronotopes, of which I believe especially 
two are rewardingly illuminating as regards my discussion of The End of the Affair: the 
chronotope of the road and the chronotope of threshold. In the first, time ‘fuses together 
with space and flows in it (forming the road); this is the source of the rich metaphorical 
expansion of the road as a course: “the course of a life,” “to set out on a new course,” “the 
course of history” and so on; varied and multi-leveled are the ways in which road is turned 
into a metaphor, but its fundamental pivot is the flow of time’ (Bakhtin 1981: 244). The 
second chronotope, which Bakhtin sees as particularly charged with emotion and value, 
has its most fundamental instance as ‘the chronotope of crisis and break in a life’ (Bakhtin 
1981: 248, original emphasis). It is connected with ‘the breaking point of a life, the 
moment of crisis, the decision that changes a life (or the indecisiveness that fails to change 
a life, the fear to step over the threshold)’ (Bakthin 1981: 248). Furthermore, in literature, 
this chronotope is more often than not implicitly metaphorical and symbolic (Bakhtin 
1981: 248). The significance of the chronotopes in Bakhtin’s theory is their meaning for 
narrative as organising centres for the narrative events of the novel. ‘The chronotope is the 
place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied. It can be said without qualification 
that to them belongs the meaning that shapes narrative’ (Bakhtin 1981: 250). 
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 In The End of the Affair the chronotope of the road is epitomised by memory. We 
need to remind ourselves that the fictional universe Greene invites us to take part of, is the 
‘unmapped’ roads of the writing protagonist’s memory. First and foremost, he invites us 
into what narratology terms the frame of narrative, or frame story, which, in our case, is 
Bendrix memorising and writing his account in 1949. For some strange reason many 
misleadingly regard the frame narrative as just a pretext for the larger and more significant 
narrative(s) embedded within it. I am thoroughly convinced such an understanding implies 
nothing but a significant loss of interpretative possibilities. Much of the critical attention 
on, for instance, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, in which Marlow’s story is contained in a 
frame, told as it is to a fellow sailor while waiting in the Thames estuary for the tide to 
turn, has been focused on the frame and how it enriches interpretation of the embedded 
story. Having learnt from his great ‘teacher,’ Greene exploits the frame narrative in much 
the same interpretatively fecund way.  
 The embedded story of the novel under investigation here consists roughly of 
significant past events which comprise a major part of Bendrix’s lived life. As such, they 
present themselves to Bendrix in the psychic space of memory as ‘encounters’ on the road. 
These encounters with past events, or ‘moments of experience’ as Bendrix calls them, 
become narrative reflections of the historical physical space and time, in which the past 
events once took place. The flow of time in the embedded narrative is the flow of time in 
and between these encounters. Obviously, those are constructions the reader must make 
and bear in mind when reading the embedded story. A typical aspect of these encounters is 
that, to an extensive degree, they are charged with value and sentiment. For instance, 
returning from the lavatory, Bendrix repeats to Henry the two lines he had seen (‘Damn 
you, landlord, and your breasty wife,’ and ‘To all pimps and whores a merry syphilis and a 
happy gonorrhea.’):  
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I wanted to shock him, and it surprised me when he said simply, ‘Jealousy’s an awful 
thing.’ ‘You mean the bit about the breasty wife?’ ‘Both of them. When you are miserable, 
you envy other people’s happiness.’ It wasn’t what I had ever expected him to learn in the 
Ministry of Home Security. And there – in the phrase – the bitterness leaks again out of my 
pen. What a dull lifeless quality this bitterness is. If I could I would write with love, but if I 
could write with love, I would be another man: I would never have lost love. (11-12, italics 
mine)  
 
There is a sense, I believe, in which ‘again’ accentuates that the feelings which once 
accompanied an experience are still there, one way or another, when encountering the 
same instance through memory. In other words, the passage does not only convey that 
Bendrix is saturated with bitterness when writing; it also suggests that the psychic 
reflection of physis in memory epitomises past sentiments. But an even more typical trait 
of these reflections is that the past sentiments have been modified, complemented and 
sometimes even replaced by more recent ones. When Bendrix writes about the start of his 
relationship with Sarah, which presumably must have been enjoyable times for him, he 
says: ‘What a summer it was. I am not going to try and name the month exactly – I should 
have to go back to it through so much pain,’ and ‘I would have liked to have left that past 
time alone, for as I write of 1939 I feel all my hatred returning’ (26, 27, italics mine). As 
readers we experience Bendrix’s ‘moments of experience’ as revisions and not as 
transparent visions of the past. It is fair to claim that this is one of the strengths of The End 
of the Affair as an artistic work purporting to portray the realistic quality of memory and 
existence. That Greene makes use of modernist paraphernalia, as I displayed in my second 
chapter, does not oppose such a purpose. Part of the modernist cry to ‘make it new’ was to 
establish new aesthetic principles which could pave the way for art to become more 
accurate and genuine in depicting existence – realism had proven insufficient to that task. 
Be that as it may, I can only agree with Sarah, as she puts it in her diary, that ‘you can hear 
the nerves twitch through [Bendrix’s] sentences’ (119). 
 If the chronotope of the road is the organising centre for the overall structure of the 
novel, the chronotope of threshold is the organising centre for the embedded narrative. 
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This has already been indicated when I commented on the epigraph of the novel in my 
previous chapter, suggesting that the psychic transition would be one from disbelief to 
belief. As one commentator suggests, ‘the novel may be seen as the dynamic interplay of 
narrative strategies by which Bendrix moves gradually from belief in the finite boundaries 
of reality to an increasing scepticism of them that brings him finally to the threshold of a 
new ontological orientation’ (Walker 1984: 223). Walker is unquestionably right as regards 
the latter part of this quote, but he misses the mark slightly when he claims that this 
movement occurs by the dynamic interplay of narrative strategies. He seems to have 
forgotten that Bendrix at the beginning of his account admits that he as of 1949 is a 
believer. The movement he so perceptively puts his finger on happens in the embedded 
story, not in the frame. It is thus intriguing to investigate how and where this transition 
takes place, and I believe a potentially rewarding point of departure is to look at how 
memory works on the diegetic level of the narrative. According to Augustine, ‘[m]emory is 
altogether specific to the individual, but beyond its particularity and uniqueness it also 
affords a bridge between time and eternity and is the nonlocatable locus where the 
individual may discover God’ (Olney 1998: 17). In the remainder of this chapter I shall try 
to show how Bendrix’s movement towards a discovery of, and a belief in, God is curiously 
analogous to Augustine’s claim that God can be found in memory. Whenever I find it 
suitable, I shall also comment on memory, temporality and God as problematic aspects 
extending into the frame narrative. Finally, I shall focus the discussion on the proposition I 
briefly mentioned in the second chapter about movement and stasis.  
 
Memory and God 
 
After Bendrix has met with Sarah in ‘the church at the corner of Park Road’ (128) for what 
turns out to be their final meeting, and where he has confidently reassured himself that he 
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finally knows ‘the end of the story’ (128), Bendrix reverts to his daily routine, writing the 
‘minimum of seven hundred and fifty words’ (132) a day. While awaiting news from Sarah 
Bendrix makes notes for the life of General Gordon, reflecting: ‘Why had I been invited to 
write this biography? I often wondered. They would have done better to have chosen an 
author who believed in Gordon’s God. I could appreciate the obstinate stand at Khartoum – 
the hatred of the safe politicians at home, but the Bible on the desk belonged to another 
world of thought from mine’ (132, italics mine). Having already read two thirds of his 
account, we really wonder if the Bible actually belongs to such an alien world as Bendrix 
claims. The text, so far, has in fact been saturated with Biblical allusions and the ongoing 
battle with the transcendental. In the main, these appear in the extradiegetic passages, but 
there are also traces of them in the diegetic ones, as, for instance, when Bendrix and Mr 
Parkis’s son pay the atheist Mr Smythe a visit. Bendrix reacts when Mr Smythe wants to 
talk to the boy, whom the schoolmasters and the priests have ‘only just begun to 
corrupt…with their lies’ (82), according to the rationalist: 
‘What did you want to ask him?’ 
‘I wanted him to feel at home here because then he might return. There are so many things 
one wants to tell a child. How the world came into existence. I wanted to tell him about 
death. I wanted to rid him of all the lies they inject at school.’ 
‘Rather a lot to do in half an hour.’ 
‘One can sow a seed.’ 
I said maliciously, ‘That comes out of the Gospels.’ 
‘Oh, I’ve been corrupted too. You don’t need to tell me that.’  
‘Do people really come to you – on the quiet?’ 
‘You’d be surprised,’ Miss Smythe said. ‘People are longing for a message of hope.’ 
‘Hope?’ 
Yes, hope,’ Smythe said. ‘Can’t you see what hope there’d be, if everybody in the world 
knew that there was nothing else but what we have here? No future compensation, rewards, 
punishments.’ His face had a crazy nobility when one cheek was hidden. ‘Then we’d begin 
to make this world like heaven.’ 
‘There’s a terrible lot to be explained first,’ I said. 
‘Can I show you my library?’ 
‘It’s the beat rationalist library in South London,’ Miss Smythe explained. 
‘I don’t need to be converted, Mr Smythe. I believe in nothing as it is. Except now and 
then.’ 
‘It’s the now and thens we have to deal with.’ 
‘The odd thing is that those are the moments of hope.’ (83, italics mine) 
 
 74
There are basically two points I would like to make from this extract. First, Bendrix 
discloses the fact that he from time to time – in the ‘now and thens’ – has found moments 
of refuge and hope in belief. It seems like he has not managed to keep what he and Sarah 
had so happily agreed upon: ‘to eliminate God from [their] world’ (69). Secondly, we can 
infer that Bendrix must have had significant knowledge of the Bible, for not only does he 
recognise Smythe’s phrase as taken from the Bible, but he immediately knows the exact 
place it is taken from – the Gospels. Of course, such knowledge may be due to nothing else 
than the cultural heritage of the society in which Bendrix finds himself. Unquestionably, 
part of tradition are Biblical stories and the various interpretations which are generated 
from them: ‘If we had not been taught how to interpret the story of the Passion,’ wonders 
Bendrix at one instance, ‘would we have been able to say from their actions alone whether 
it was the jealous Judas or the cowardly Peter who loved Christ?’ (27). Besides 
emphasising that the Bible – God’s supreme and perfect ‘novel’ – is present in the mind of 
Bendrix at such an early stage of the novel, Greene also exploits this traditional 
interpretation to parallel Bendrix and Judas, possibly suggesting, it seems to me, Bendrix’s 
rather unconventional love for Christ. What is important, however, is that before Bendrix 
even starts conversing and arguing with God, God has been present in Bendrix’s memory 
either as little seeds of belief or through the recognition of His Word.  
 When we move up to the next narrative level, the extradiegetic, Biblical allusions 
become more prevalent. As for now, I shall only look at one particular instance in which I 
believe the allusion stands out as notably powerful and effective. Once again we shall turn 
our attention to the interpretatively suggestive opening of the novel. What Bendrix actually 
does when he starts his account by stating that ‘[a] story has no beginning or end,’ 
comprises nothing less than an act of defiance against God and His Word. As readers, we 
are in medias res thrown into the battle Bendrix fights with his opponent. Presumably, this 
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may not come to mind on a first reading, but rereading reveals, I believe, that Bendrix’s 
opening defies the two openings of the Bible – the openings of the Old and the New 
Testament. The opening of the Book of Genesis, which I quoted in the previous chapter, is 
summarised and angled somewhat differently in the opening of the Gospel of St John: ‘In 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The 
same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was 
not any thing made that was made’ (The Bible: 114). The intriguing aspect of this is that 
both Bendrix and God are thoroughly dependent on language in order to express 
themselves, or rather, express their own beings or selves. God is contingent on the Word in 
order to convey his own self (‘And God said,’ we recall from the Book of Genesis), 
whereas Bendrix’s self is sustained by the word. But God and Bendrix diverge markedly 
from one another in that God is able to define a beginning of His story, while Bendrix, 
because of his inability to comprehend the whole of his being, finds it completely 
impossible even to delineate a beginning, as well as an end, of his, which is just another 
way of saying that he cannot define a beginning and end of his own self.  
 Furthermore, into this first sentence of the novel is also incorporated the 
juxtaposition of God and Bendrix as Creator and creator, Artist and artist and Plotter and 
plotter, which I briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. God is the supreme Artist who 
creates the World and makes man in His image by uttering the Word, and He rules as the 
unsurpassed Plotter of history. By comparison, Bendrix is only the praised artist and 
novelist who can create fictional worlds with fictional characters, and when he writes his 
own story down he realises that he has not been the ‘plotter’ – at least not the one he 
believed he was – of his own life and that all he now can convey is ‘an indeterminate 
figure’ (18). All this is germinal in, and I am tempted to claim generated by, the way Sarah 
juxtaposes her old lover with her new in the way she addresses them. Coming home from 
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her walk on that ‘black wet January night’ when Henry has unburdened his troubled mind 
to Bendrix, Sarah, surprised to find Bendrix there, exclaims: ‘“You?” She had always 
called me “you.” “Is that you?” on the telephone, “Can you? Will you? Do you?” so that I 
imagined, like a fool, for a few minutes at a time, there was only one “you” in the world 
and that was me’ (18). However, when Bendrix starts reading Sarah’s diary, which he 
curiously enough does by reading the end of it first, he is at once confronted with the 
superior ‘lover’ who has replaced him: ‘…anything left, when we’d finished, but You.…so 
that one day we might have nothing left except this love of You. But You are too good to 
me. When I ask You for pain, You give me peace’ (89). The ‘you’ with capital initial stares 
Bendrix mockingly in the face and becomes a reminder of his own inferiority.  
One of the pivotal scenes in terms of ‘the way towards the threshold’ in the 
embedded narrative is the scene where Bendrix, after having pursued Sarah for a long 
while, finally finds her in the Catholic church: 
I sat down behind her like Mr Parkis and waited. I could have waited years now that I knew 
the end of the story. I was cold and wet and very happy. I could even look with charity 
towards the altar and the figure dangling there. She loves us both, I thought, but if there is 
to be a conflict between an image and a man, I know who will win. I could put my hand on 
her thigh or my mouth on her breast: he was imprisoned behind the altar and couldn’t move 
to plead his cause…looking  up at the altar I thought with triumph, almost as though he 
were a living rival, You see – these are the arguments that win, and gently moved my 
fingers across her breast. (128, 130, original emphasis) 
 
Being on his opponent’s territory, on God’s home ground, Bendrix sets up, for the first 
time in the story, this conflict between image and man. Again, I am inclined to suggest that 
Greene intentionally and successfully draws on the Creation account, making Bendrix 
reverse the original analogy between God and his image. While accentuating his own 
originality, Bendrix, at this stage, confidently takes delight in the conviction that God is 
only a product generated by human imagination, a confined image left unable ‘to plead his 
cause.’ He possesses the persuasive arguments which will prevail – a ‘hand on her thigh’ 
and fingers and mouth on her breast. Nevertheless, there is a sense here that Bendrix 
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indirectly betrays his own conviction, for is it not, when one comes to think of it, a 
recognition of God to address the imprisoned image as ‘You’ with a capital letter? 
Furthermore, when Sarah again is taken with a fit of coughing, which seems ‘too big…for 
her small body’ (31, italics mine), Bendrix’s belief in his persuasive arguments seems 
shaken: ‘I came and sat beside her and put my hand on her knee while she coughed. I 
thought, If only one had a touch that could heal’ (128, italics mine). As we know from the 
following discourse, that property is only possessed by the image.  
 It is also possible to argue that, although he is not actually a character in the 
strictest sense of the term, God is the Artist in the novel who expresses himself artistically 
in metonymical ways. He presents himself metonymically to Bendrix – and also to us as 
readers – through Biblical allusions, as the image above, as the silent ‘You’ of Sarah’s and 
Bendrix’s ‘interior dialogues,’ and, not least, through Bendrix’s memories, as we shall see 
below. Bendrix, on the other hand, imposes himself as artist upon the reader through 
particularly two notable techniques. First, his account is permeated with generalisations 
such as ‘[w]e are not hurt only by tragedy: the grotesque too carries weapons, undignified, 
ridiculous weapons’ (52) and ‘[d]isbelief could be a product of hysteria just as much as 
belief’ (144). Second, the pervasive use of the simile underscores Bendrix’s intrusive 
artistry. These may serve as illustrative examples: ‘I had fallen out of their sight as 
completely as a stone in a pond’ (9), ‘Henry was important, but important rather as an 
elephant is important, from the size of his department (10) and ‘[h]e was like the first 
enemy soldier a man encounters on a battlefield, dead and indistinguishable, not a White or 
a Red, but just a human being like himself’ (183).  
Having established God as an Artist in Bendrix’s account, let us now look at how 
Bendrix comes to realise God. This, I will argue, is a continuation of the proposition I 
brought up in the second chapter, where I suggested that space becomes metonymical of 
 78
different temporalities. I would like to start this part of the discussion by paying attention 
to the incident where Bendrix comes round after the V1 explosion: 
My mind for a few moments was clear of everything except a sense of tiredness as though I 
had been on a long journey. I had no memory at all of Sarah and I was completely free 
from anxiety, jealousy, insecurity, hate: my mind was a blank sheet on which somebody 
had just been on the point of writing a message of happiness. I felt sure that when my 
memory came, the writing would continue and that I should be happy. (71, italics mine) 
 
One of the intriguing aspects of this passage is how it seems to suggest that the happiness 
Bendrix enjoys after the explosion is a result of his loss of memory. In a state of oblivion, 
where existence is comprised of the pure present only, and where the self is never defined 
or does not exist because ‘the present of things past’ is nothing but an utter impossibility, 
Bendrix, curiously enough, finds a kind of happiness. It is, nevertheless, illustrative that the 
melancholic protagonist should find happiness in obliteration and death; after all, that 
sense is being conveyed throughout the narrative. Perhaps another passage, where Bendrix 
expresses part of his metaphysics, may serve well as a commentary on the extract above: 
‘The sense of unhappiness is so much easier to convey than that of happiness. In misery we 
seem aware of our own existence, even though it may be in the form of a monstrous 
egotism: this pain of mine is individual, this nerve that winces belongs to me and to no 
other. But happiness annihilates us: we lose our identity’ (47, italics mine).  However 
destructive it may sound, the inter-illumination of these two passages reveals that Bendrix 
is convinced happiness comes at the expense of identity and memory. Since his identity is 
defined by a memory which is only pregnant with misery and unhappiness, oblivion 
becomes the only possible sanctuary. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, obliteration is 
postponed because of Bendrix’s need to identify the mysterious Mr X, an act which 
comprises nothing less than to solve the ‘equation,’ figuratively speaking. Arguably, this 
reverberates Bendrix’s saying, at the beginning of his account, ‘I find it hard to conceive of 
any God who is not as simple as a perfect equation’ (11, italics mine).  
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 There is one further point I would like to make from the extract above: Bendrix 
seems to equate his memory of Sarah with his memory in general. In a succinct way the 
passage displays how Sarah constitutes the centre of, and even saturates the whole of, 
Bendrix’s memory. His memory is penetrated by Sarah both on the level of the embedded 
narrative and on the level of the frame, and thinking in terms of the spatial arrangements of 
the novel, it is typical that Sarah’s diary is placed significantly in the physical centre of 
Bendrix’s narrative. However, it is God who comprises the centre of both Bendrix’s 
memory of Sarah and of the diary itself. Thus, I believe it is fair to claim that God, through 
Sarah, penetrates both the protagonist’s memory as well as his narrative, and I shall now 
move on to explore this in further detail. 
 In the wake of Sarah’s death there are several instances where space predominantly 
invokes different temporalities. In everyday life it is very often taken for granted that space 
has such a function, and it might even seem a too obvious point to make, but it is 
nevertheless a fact that, because of memory, we connect different times of our lives to 
particular spatial dimensions. A familiar space does not only indicate the actual ‘here and 
now,’ it also invokes every significant past encounter with that space, and as such it 
presents itself to us as a fusion of temporalities. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard, 
whose The Poetics of Space is a significant contribution to understanding human 
conception of space, argues that in ‘its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. 
That is what space is for’ (Bachelard 1994: 8). Perhaps I put too much emphasis on this 
proposition, but since I believe Greene exploits it for particular structural and thematic 
purposes, let us first look at the episode where Henry asks Bendrix to stay at his place for 
the night. Bendrix accepts, and while Henry goes away to fetch some sheets and blankets 
Bendrix scrutinises the room around him: 
I looked at the parquet floor, and I remembered the exact timbre of her cry. On the desk 
where she wrote her letters was a clutter of objects, and every object I could interpret like a 
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code. I thought, She hasn’t even thrown away that pebble. We laughed at its shape and 
there it still is, like a paper-weight. What would Henry make of it, and the miniature bottle 
of a liqueur none of us cared for, and the piece of glass polished by the sea, and the small 
wooden rabbit I had found in Nottingham? Should I take all these objects away with me? 
They would go into the waste-paper basket otherwise, when Henry at last got around to 
clearing up, but could I bear their company? (139, italics mine) 
 
 To interpret every object like a code suggests a distinct recognition of the object’s history 
or of the fused temporalities inherent in that object. For instance, when he views the 
parquet floor, he, and we as readers, recall how he ‘crouched on the floor beside her and 
watched and watched, as though I might never see this again – the brown indeterminate-
coloured hair like a pool of liquor on the parquet, the sweat on her forehead, the heavy 
breathing as though she had run a race and now like a young athlete lay in the exhaustion 
of victory’ (49). The moment when he had put his ‘hand gently over her mouth to deaden 
that strange sad angry cry of abandonment’ (49, italics mine) is still present in the parquet 
floor. But the reason why Bendrix wonders whether he can bear ‘the company’ of these 
objects is that God has intruded upon the memories attached to them. Having read the note 
from Sarah’s waste-paper basket and, not least, her diary, Bendrix remembers how Sarah 
had addressed God: ‘I know I am only beginning to love, but already I want to abandon 
everything but you’ (53, italics mine). He even recognises the possibly diminished role he 
had played in that event which unfolded on the parquet floor: ‘Did I ever love Maurice as 
much before I loved You?’ speculates Sarah, ‘[o]r was it really You I loved all the time? 
Did I touch You when I touched him?’ (123). All this is arguably part of the code Bendrix 
interprets when looking at the floor. 
 Days later, Bendrix even moves in with Henry and begins to see what Henry had 
meant ‘by the house never being empty’ (171): ‘I don’t know how to express it. Because 
she’s always away, she’s never away. You see, she’s never anywhere else. She’s not 
having lunch with anybody, she’s not at a cinema with you. There’s nowhere for her to be 
but at home’ (169). The house is metonymically filled with Sarah; the cupboards full of 
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clothes, compacts, scents and the stair that ‘always squeaked’ (136, 46), and everything 
comes together to comprise the impression that Sarah ‘stood at the end of every path’ 
(137), (and beside her stands God). Even space which never was part of the life of Sarah 
becomes a reminder of her: ‘Sarah and I never drank Chianti and now the act of drinking it 
reminded me of that fact. I might as well have had our favourite claret, I couldn’t have 
thought of her more. Even vacancy was crowded with her’ (161, original emphasis). 
Thinking in terms of ‘vacancy,’ it is intriguing to notice that the three-year silence between 
the historical occurrence of the events and the act of putting them down to paper must have 
been ‘crowded’ with memories of Sarah. ‘There wasn’t any point in trying to avoid her 
even for a moment. I thought, why did You have to do this to us? If she hadn’t believed in 
You she would be alive now, we should have been lovers still’ (137). Even the numerous 
encounters with Mr Parkis, after their business has been concluded, and the meetings with 
the atheist Mr Smythe, point towards Sarah and subsequently towards God. And when 
talking about Mr Parkis and Mr Smythe after Sarah’s death, we move into the critical 
minefield of the novel. 
 For it is in the miracles which occur in the story that God (and His accomplice, 
Sarah) displays his metonymical artistry in the most powerful and effective way. The 
miracles attributed to Sarah comprise the aspect of the novel which has received most 
critical attention over the years. According to Cedric Watts, when comparing Greene’s 
novels, The End of the Affair stands out in that God’s intervention is so direct and manifest 
in the arrangements of events that ‘[e]ven a believer might flinch at the extent to which the 
outcome appears to depend on supernatural intervention…If the evidence had been more 
ambiguous, it might have been more plausible’ (Watts 1996: 61-62). The list of 
supernatural incidents appears long; Bendrix’s life saved by Sarah’s wager with God, Mr 
Smythe’s spots healed by his sleeping on a scrap of Sarah’s hair, Bendrix rescued from 
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fornication with Sylvia Black and Mr Parkis’s twelve-year-old boy healed by reading a 
note in one of Sarah’s childhood books. Even Greene himself came to regret that he had 
made the miracles so explicit in the novel. In the introduction to the 1974 Collected Edition 
text, he says: ‘I realised too late how I had been cheating – cheating myself, cheating the 
reader…..The incident of the strawberry mark [the strawberry mark was replaced by 
urticaria in this edition] should have had no place in the book; every so-called miracle, like 
the curing of Parkis’s boy, ought to have had a completely natural explanation’ (quoted in 
Watts 1996: 62). Even though the miracles appear less than plausible from both a rational 
and a less rational point of view, I am bold enough to disagree with Greene on that point. 
Obviously, many of the points I made in the previous chapter would have been 
unconvincing and superfluous if the so-called miracles had had perfectly natural 
explanations, but even more importantly, Bendrix would not then have fought God so 
fiercely by writing ‘The End of the Affair.’ Figuratively speaking, every word of Bendrix’s 
discourse demands that something supernatural has taken place, whether we believe it 
possible or not. Without this direct and manifest intervention from God, Bendrix would not 
have conceived of his opponent as a real and active character in his life, and consequently 
there would not have been a story to write. Removing God’s direct intervention in the story 
would arguably have implied removing the structural and thematic centres of the novel – 
The End of the Affair would become a totally different novel or not a novel at all. 
However, since it is beyond the scope of my thesis to investigate this any further, I shall 
return to the exploration of Bendrix’s way towards God. 
 There is particularly one visual metaphor which frequently appears in the text and 
therefore demands specific attention: that of the disease or the cure. At the cremation of 
Sarah’s body, which is a result of Bendrix’s denying her a Catholic funeral in a challenge 
to God to ‘[r]esurrect that body if you can’ (137), Bendrix meets with Sarah’s mother, Mrs 
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Bertram, who tells him that Sarah was baptised at the age of two. ‘Suddenly, inexplicably, 
I felt fear, like a man who has committed the all-but-perfect crime and watches the first 
unexpected crack in the wall of his deception. How deep does the crack go? Can it be 
plugged in time?’ wonders Bendrix (162). And then it is that Mrs Bertram discloses that 
she ‘always had a wish that it would “take”. Like vaccination’ (164). It is repeated again 
when Henry days later confesses to Bendrix: ‘It’s an extraordinary coincidence, isn’t it? 
Baptized at two years old, and then beginning to go back to what you can’t even 
remember…It’s like an infection’ (187, italics mine). Confronted with these two 
statements, Bendrix is at once reminded of something Sarah wrote in the letter he received 
after her death: ‘I’ve caught belief like a disease. I’ve fallen into belief like I fell in love’ 
(147, italics mine). The existential opposition between human free will and divine 
predetermination, on which I commented in the previous chapter, is arguably incorporated 
into this image of disease, and it makes Bendrix tremble with fear: 
It wasn’t you that ‘took’, I told the God I didn’t believe in, that imaginary God whom 
Sarah thought had saved my life (for what conceivable purpose?) and who had ruined even 
in his non-existence the only deep happiness I had ever experienced: oh no, it wasn’t you 
that took, for that would have been magic and I believe in magic even less than I believe in 
You: magic is your cross, your resurrection of the body, your holy Catholic church, your 
communion of saints. 
I lay on my back and watched the shadows of the Common trees shift on my ceiling. It’s 
just a coincidence, I thought, a horrible coincidence that nearly brought her back at the end 
to You. You can’t mark a two-year-old child for life with a bit of water and a prayer. If I 
began to believe that, I could believe in the body and the blood. You didn’t own her all 
those years: I owned her. You won in the end, You don’t need to remind me of that, but she 
wasn’t deceiving me with You when she lay here with me, on this bed, with this pillow 
under her back. When she slept, I was with her, not You. It was I who penetrated her, not 
You. (164-165) 
 
Part of Bendrix’s worrying here is his jealousy, and I believe it is rewarding to 
pause for a while and consider a much earlier incident of the novel. When Bendrix visits 
Mr Savage, the ‘specialist who dealt in only one disease of which he knew every symptom’ 
(21), he feels like a patient ‘sick enough to try the famous shock treatment for jealousy’ 
(20). Suggesting that Bendrix’s jealousy is a disease – which it seemingly is, as Bendrix 
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becomes almost exhausted by it – Greene exploits this further when he invokes the old 
notion of God as a ‘jealous God’: ‘Jealousy, or so I have always believed, exists only with 
desire. The Old Testament writers were fond of using the words “a jealous God”, and 
perhaps it was their rough and oblique way of expressing belief in the love of God for 
man’ (42). Thus, it seems possible to claim that it is God’s jealousy which has ‘taken’ 
Sarah either like a vaccination, considered from a positive point of view, or, negatively, 
like an infection, as Henry believes. Bendrix’s predicament, then, is that he cannot 
compete with something that just ‘takes’ like that. God’s jealousy seems forcefully 
manifest and yet too vague and intangible for him to fight. Nevertheless, he puts up a good 
fight, as we have already seen, for he hits the mark when he asserts of himself that he is ‘as 
strong as a horse’ (147). Towards the end of this chapter I shall elaborate more on what I 
see as Bendrix’s predicament. As for now, I want to draw attention to Bendrix’s search for 
a beginning, something which is partly triggered by his meeting with Mrs Bertram. 
To search for a beginning relates in a very direct way to incorporating plot into 
one’s life. Much has been said already about plot in the previous chapter, but I believe 
some additional comments are in order. In Western culture, attempts to make time cohere 
continue to be drawn from the biblical view of temporality, as Kermode sees it in The 
Sense of an Ending. This notion of time is concerned with beginnings and endings; it is 
broken into periods of significance (kairos) and is different from the undifferentiated, 
continuous flow (chronos). The beginning of a period of kairos is identified by the 
occurrence of an event that makes a difference in our lives, and the ending is marked by a 
resolution and return to a routine. Kairos ‘is the season, a point in time filled with 
significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end’ (Kermode 1981: 
47). Seen in isolation, the incident from the fatal night of June 1944 to Sarah’s subsequent 
break with Bendrix can, for instance, be considered a period of kairos. But what is so 
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special about Bendrix’s meeting with Mrs Bertram is that he starts to spot the contour of 
the overarching period of kairos in Sarah’s life, the beginning being obviously her baptism 
at the age of two and the resolution her leap into a faith in God and, finally, a leap through 
death to her new ‘lover.’ It sounds almost impossible to him, but when he lies on the floor 
with Sarah’s children’s books and tries ‘to trace at least a few features in the blank spaces 
of Sarah’s life,’ because there ‘are times when a lover longs to be also a father and a 
brother: he is jealous of the years he hasn’t shared’ (172), the picture appears clearer to 
him:  
Even the deaths were ‘period’, and ‘period’ too was the school girl who marked the pages 
with lines, exclamation marks, who wrote neatly in the margin of Scott’s last letter home: 
‘And what comes next? Is it God? Robert Browning.’ Even then, I thought, He came into 
her mind. He was as underhand as a lover, taking advantage of a passing mood, like a hero 
seducing us with his improbabilities and his legends. I put the last book back and turned the 
key in the lock. (173, original emphasis) 
 
Looking back at ‘the blank spaces of Sarah’s life,’ Bendrix again and again finds God as 
symptoms of the disease she was infected with when baptised. With his ‘great schemes’ 
(191) God seems to force himself upon Bendrix’s consciousness as the great puppet 
master, who, whenever he finds it convenient, can pull this or that string, ruining 
‘happiness like a harvester ruins a mouse’s nest’ (191). It has been as easy for God to take 
Sarah away from Bendrix as it would have been easy for Bendrix to have taken Sylvia 
from Waterbury, the critic (156). In this period of kairos in Sarah’s life, Bendrix has only 
played the minor part; it is God who stands at the centre of events, to Bendrix’s 
disappointment and frustration. 
 Having found God in memory, as the centre of the significant past, Bendrix moves 
into what I have called the dialectics between movement and stasis, and I shall start 
exploring this proposition by once again returning to the opening of the novel. 
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Movement and Stasis 
 
In his essay called ‘“The Dangerous Edge”: Beginning with Death,’ Alan Warren 
Friedman surveys the eschatology of Greene’s fiction, claiming: ‘Graham Greene’s is a 
post-mortem fiction: his novels commonly begin with or presume death and then circle 
back to that originating end as if time had stuck there and only a repetition of doom were 
possible’ (Friedman 1990: 131). In a very curious way this reverberates Walter Benjamin’s 
‘The Storyteller,’ where he intriguingly claims that ‘[d]eath is the sanction of everything 
that the storyteller can tell. He has borrowed his authority from death’ (Benjamin 2000: 
19). These two quotes succinctly pinpoint the mood and atmosphere we are confronted 
with at the opening of The End of the Affair. For not only does Bendrix’s account begin 
with the end, that is his present situation of 1949, it also depicts how he perceives existence 
as spiritually and artistically barren, with a complete absence of a direction and a purpose 
to life. Death confronts him at once as something attractive and as something he has to 
deny. And it is in this vacuum, within these seemingly narrow boundaries between 
acceptance and avoidance of death, that Bendrix finds sanction and authority for writing 
his story. 
 Furthermore, death is presumed at yet another level of the opening chapter. 
Towards the end of it, when Sarah returns from her walk and finds Bendrix together with 
Henry, death is again highlighted: 
‘It’s a filthy night,’ I said accusingly, and Henry added with apparent anxiety, ‘You’re wet 
through, Sarah. One day you’ll catch your death of cold.’ 
A cliché with its popular wisdom can sometimes fall through a conversation like a note of 
doom, yet even if we had known he spoke the truth, I wonder if either of us would have felt 
any genuine anxiety for her break through our nerves, distrust, and hate. (18, original 
emphasis) 
 
Instead of letting this passage work as a typical literary prolepsis, making the reader 
speculate whether Sarah will die or not, Greene makes his writing protagonist dismiss any 
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such speculation at once. Sarah will die, we learn, even though such a confirmation runs at 
the expense of suspense. What is of importance is not that Sarah will die – Bendrix does 
not write primarily to entertain his readers with suspense – but what Sarah’s death has 
generated. Death appears again as the motivator and lender of authority. 
 Bendrix’s emphasis and focus on ‘the end’ is fascinatingly manifest and 
underscored on many levels of the story. His experience as a writer, for instance, has 
taught him that so ‘much of a novelist’s writing…takes place in the unconscious: in those 
depths the last word is written before the first’ (35, italics mine). Even when we consider 
his rather peculiar habits as a reader this end-focus is accentuated. When he receives the 
letter from Mr Parkis, in which Mr Parkis explains how his boy was healed by the 
‘memento’ of Sarah, Bendrix reads the last sentences first and then returns to the beginning 
afterwards (177). And the way he reads Sarah’s diary is certainly not an exception: ‘For it 
was the last couple of pages I read first, and I read them again at the end to make sure’ 
(88). Consequently, it all adds to show that ‘the end’ pervades the whole of the 
protagonist’s existence.  
 For Bendrix has come to the end of existence. He is ‘beginning to doubt whether 
anything [he] can do will ever alter the course of events’ (66), and he comes to realise that 
it is in fact he who is the ‘imprisoned image’ and not Christ hanging on the cross in that 
church at the corner of Park Road. Returning to his home where the pivotal scene of the 
novel once took place, Bendrix sees existence for what it is: ‘I looked at the hall, clear as a 
cell, hideous with green paint, and I thought, she wanted me to have a second chance and 
here it is: the empty life, odourless, antiseptic, the life of a prison, and I accused her as 
though her prayers had really worked the change: what did I do to you that you had to 
condemn me to life?’ (145, italics mine). Even the way Greene ingeniously plays with the 
colour of life – green – making Bendrix conceive of that colour as something detestable, 
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manifests in a forceful way how much Bendrix has come to deplore existence. This artistic 
technique is again exploited by Greene towards the end of the novel when Bendrix and 
Henry walk over the Common towards the Pontefract Arms: ‘the lights were out, and 
lovers met where the roads intersected, and on the other side of the grass was the house 
with the ruined steps where He gave me back this hopeless crippled life’ (191, italics 
mine). To stay alive does not imply the same as to embrace life to Bendrix. He recognises 
life all around him with all its green and all its grass, where love continues where roads 
intersect, but where he is barred from embracing it, imprisoned as he is in his crippled 
existence. 
 I have titled this thesis ‘Tied to the Pendulum’s Swing’ because I find that it 
describes and captures the essence of Bendrix’s predicament and his project, ‘The End of 
the Affair,’ in an interesting way. Perhaps we should let Bendrix speak for himself: ‘the 
pendulum of my desire swung tiringly to and fro, the desire to forget and to remember, to 
be dead and to keep alive a while longer’ (140). It is striking that it is within these 
extremes, within this dichotomous psychic space, Bendrix moves. To see this – and since 
Bendrix’s predicament is rewardingly explained from that point of departure – let us once 
again consider Bendrix’s comment that he is ‘writing this account of her, trying to get her 
out of [his] system for ever (58): If Bendrix can get Sarah out of his system, he fulfils his 
uttermost desire to get God out of his system, since God is always at the centre of his 
memories of Sarah. However, that is only possible in death and annihilation of memory, 
and as such, death confronts Bendrix as something desirable. But because of the possibility 
that God, the enemy who ironically robbed Bendrix of all life by giving it back to him, 
may be whom he confronts when he moves beyond that temporal veil which comprises 
death, Bendrix finds it necessary to postpone death. All there is left is time, where neither 
the past, the present or the future – or whatever temporal dimension there will be beyond 
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death – is redeemable, as Eliot’s persona so fittingly puts it. Just as there is movement on 
the swing of the pendulum, there is movement in memory (the chronotope of the road) and 
movement in Bendrix’s narrative constructions of the past (the chronotope of threshold), 
but the rest of his existence constitutes only a positional stasis bound to time. Bendrix’s is 
a catch-22 situation where life is stuck in limbo, and where his only final weapon is a 
prayer to God to leave him alone for an eternity (192). But to what purpose, he does not 
know.  
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
 
 
They’ve changed everything now. We used to think there was a beginning and a middle 
and an end. We believed in the Aristotelian theory.9
 
 
At every moment of his life, every human being is his own journey, and the only temporal 
and spatial point of the journey he can define with a certain accuracy is the end – the actual 
here and now. The rest of the journey is accumulated and stored in memory. Every human 
being is his own memory, he is his own narrative, and that narrative constitutes his own 
identity. Besides his memory, on which his whole being is dependent, he only knows death 
for certain. The End of the Affair is a narrative journey which curiously enough starts with 
the end and moves backwards in time, in search for its own beginning. Furthermore, there 
is a sense in which it ends where it begins, with the frustrated and purposeless position of 
Maurice Bendrix, the narrator: it is a circular story. In his investigation into the modernist 
short story, Dominic Head maintains that the ‘modernist circular, or spiral story, is usually 
an exploration of disunity’ (Head 1992: 11), and as such, I believe he lends a fair 
description to The End of the Affair. The novel concerns a narrator who despairingly tries 
to narrate his own past and, implicitly, his own self. The disunity, however, stems from the 
utter impossibility and futility of the protagonist’s taking on such a project. Ironically, it is 
memory and narrative which comprise the impassable obstacles which prevent Bendrix 
from reaching his much desired goal. 
 Greene has effectively set his novel in times of war and peace in order to enhance 
the dichotomy which pervades the story on so many different levels. Another crucial 
                                                 
9 Thomas Hardy, recorded in Virginia Woolf, A Writer’s Diary (New York, 1954), p. 136; quoted in Stephen 
Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, p. 31. 
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spatial element of the novel, which also underscores this dichotomy, is the pervasive usage 
of the motif of the pursuit. Both these, I have made a claim for, have a reflective quality 
attached to them, in the sense that they allude to the interior violence and pursuits taking 
place within the characters. Additionally, attention has been drawn to the juxtaposition of 
what I have called experiential temporalities, especially to the different ways Sarah and 
Bendrix experience time. By doing so, Bendrix appears as a character who cannot keep up 
with, or understand the workings of, time – time leaves him out of control. However, the 
bitterness and anger he projects on time motivates the temporal manipulation we confront 
in his narrative. Like the movement of the pendulum’s swing, Bendrix’s narrative 
fluctuates between the present and the past, continually moving backwards and forwards 
across the chronological span of the action. It has led me to conclude that what he is 
writing is partly a diatribe against time. Sarah, on the other hand, is the embracer of the 
present, and it is significant, I have claimed, that it is she who experiences the epiphany of 
the novel. Hers has been a momentary discovery of God. 
 Bendrix’s route towards God is totally different. As I have argued in my fourth 
chapter, memory constitutes the thematic and structural centre of both the frame narrative 
and the embedded narrative. As far as the latter is concerned, it deals with how Bendrix 
comes to a recognition of, and a rather idiosyncratic belief in, God. In a comparable way to 
St Augustine’s conviction that memory comprises the bridge between time and eternity, I 
have proposed that our protagonist finds God in memory. In a specific way this discovery 
relates to the metonymical quality of space. Given an encounter with memory, space 
inheres the possibility to invoke different temporalities of our lives. In Bendrix’s case, the 
spatial surroundings point emphatically towards Sarah and, in the final analysis, towards 
God. If The End of the Affair is considered as an overall expression of Bendrix’s memory, 
it is illustrative that the extracts from Sarah’s diary are placed at the physical centre of the 
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novel, and, furthermore, that her epiphanic moment comprises the significant centre of 
those. God is the apotheosis of Bendrix’s memory. From Bendrix’s point of view, God is 
perceived as being an active character intervening in human affairs, and, as such, he cannot 
stay remote and neutral towards Him: a stance of existential importance needs to be taken. 
 The embedded narrative and the novel end at this point, but, curiously enough, it 
also begins there. The three years of silence, one must presume, must have consisted of this 
existential predicament which finally escalates into ‘The End of the Affair.’ By analysing 
the opening of the novel, I have pointed to several aspects which strongly connect with 
memory and narrative. Every narrative shares the property of having a physical beginning: 
the textual fabric has to start somewhere. However, in terms of content, each narrative has 
its very own beginning. What Bendrix does in his opening is to raise the question of 
whether the content with which he starts his own narrative – and the narrative, we need to 
remind ourselves, is one of autobiography – is arbitrarily or consciously chosen, and I have 
claimed that the problem is fundamentally one which belongs to memory itself. Memory, 
which is the present accumulation of things past, has to compromise with narrative, which 
is a physically temporal succession, by defining a point of departure. To some extent, this 
point can be consciously chosen, but, more often than not, the point has got a touch of 
arbitrariness attached to it. The End of the Affair is a search in memory for the significant 
past events which comprise the ‘plot’ of the protagonist’s life – it is a search for the self. 
Since there can be no defined beginning of one’s memory and no defined beginning of 
one’s self, there will always be doubt whether one’s narrative opening is arbitrary or not. 
From only one possible narrative beginning follows only one possible beginning of 
memory and the self, and that is in itself a utopian thought. 
 Furthermore, we have seen how Greene adds a transcendental element to this 
already riveting opening by setting up the existential opposition between human free will 
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and divine predetermination. When Bendrix speculates whether his opening is chosen by 
God or by himself, he actually ponders the question of whether the human self is self-
defined or not. If Bendrix’s self is self-defined, it means that he has been in control of his 
own past. However, when he looks back over the fields of his own past, he realises that it 
is not he but God who has been pulling this or that string to His end. God emerges to 
Bendrix’s mind as a superior Artist, up against whose plot he is left totally helpless.  
 Next, by addressing complexes like genre and motivation, I have proposed that The 
End of the Affair is a sort of autobiography which most likely is intended for publishing. 
As we have seen, this enables us to incorporate various aspects of the text into the 
protagonist’s underlying intentions with his narrative. Not only is his project an effort to 
understand his past and a diatribe against time, it is also an idiosyncratic expression of a 
confessional mind who seeks atonement for his misdoings. This runs intriguingly parallel 
to the anger he directs at God: Bendrix’s belief in God is equally proportioned between 
love and hate. The End of the Affair reverses the analogy of Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man (1914), in which Stephen Dedalus rejects religious metaphysics in order 
to embrace belief in the aesthetics of art. Bendrix has come to an end of his belief in art; he 
sees it for what it is: trivial and unimportant. Love seems long gone, and it all adds to 
emphasise that Bendrix has come to an end of existence – in a sense, he is spiritually dead. 
While fighting the transcendental, he can only await death. 
 Bendrix’s predicament is that, as he has come the end of everything, he 
despairingly desires death, since it would imply annihilation of memory. To stay alive 
means to drag with him a memory which is only pregnant with reminders of Sarah and 
God. However, since a possible outcome of death would be to confront his superior 
opponent face to face, death has to be postponed. Neither acceptance nor denial of death 
can provide him with a satisfactory denouement. As far as Bendrix is concerned, he loses 
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either way. Bendrix is tied to the pendulum’s swing, he is suspended in time and forced to 
a specific movement which constitutes nothing but a ‘running to stand still.’ Bendrix 
moves continually between extremes, back and forth between war and peace, love and 
hate, belief and disbelief, rejection and acceptance. There is movement in memory and 
movement in narrative, but the grand fact to which this movement points is that Bendrix’s 
is a case of positional stasis.  
 I began this thesis by drawing on Olney’s claim that ‘an agonized search for the 
self, through the mutually reflexive acts of memory and narrative, accompanied by the 
haunting fear that it is impossible from the beginning but also impossible to give over, is 
the very emblem of our time.’ In a riveting way, The End of the Affair portrays how its 
protagonist is compelled to embark upon such an impossible quest. The quest is completely 
unobtainable not only because memory and narrative are epistemologically and 
ontologically problematic, but also because memory has been intruded upon by a 
transcendental element. Since God is the apotheosis of his memory, Bendrix cannot ‘find’ 
his own self. The irony of the novel is that the faculty of memory and the medium of 
narrative, which at the same time motivate and enable this search, are also the factors 
which prevent the desired resolution to the project.  
 In the introductory chapter I mentioned that Greene, in a curious way, was attracted 
to death, and that his was a life lived on the perilous border. The awareness of death seems 
to have been present to his mind constantly. Confrontations with death, whether it was 
when almost dying from sickness, journeying through Liberia, when ‘enjoying’ the 
dangers of the three blitzes on London, or the many journeys he undertook with the 
possibility of being ambushed, always resulted in literary achievements, one way or 
another. It is fair to claim, it seems to me, that Greene, as a storyteller, borrowed his 
authority from death, to evoke the words of Walter Benjamin. As also Norman Sherry has 
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noted, the parallel to Bendrix is striking (Sherry 1989: xxii). Bendrix too is confronted with 
death; the end stands before him as attractive and yet terrifying. With no hope for the 
future, he can only embrace the past, or rather, the present of things past, which is memory. 
In an effort to define his self, death lends him authority, and the narrative scheme lends 
him the medium to make it manifest. His mission is not accomplished, but it certainly is a 
decent try. 
At the back of my edition of the novel William Faulkner is quoted, maintaining The 
End of the Affair is ‘one of the most true and moving novels of my time, in anybody’s 
language.’ Why is it true, and why is it moving? one might ask. Perhaps because it 
concerns one of the basic needs of human existence: to have significance. Every human 
being is a story, and, in the light of death, a human being needs that story to be of 
importance. 
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